SOME NOTES ON THE organisation OF THE UGANDAN ARMY, 1971-1979

On this page I set out what I think I know about the organisation and activities of the Uganda Army in the 1970s. This is a lengthy and tedious page, and I thank the readers for their patience.

CONTENTS

1. General matters
1.1 Introduction and general comments
1.2 Naming of units
1.3 Numbering of units
1.4 Commanding officers
1.5. Later enlargement and motorisation of the army
1.6 Which units had tanks?
1.7 Ethnic factors
1.8 The Army Chief of Staff

2. Infantry and mechanised units
2.1 1st Infantry Battalion
2.2 2nd Infantry Battalion
2.3 3rd Infantry Battalion
2.4 4th Infantry Battalion
2.5 Suicide Regiment
2.6 Malire Regiment
2.7 The alleged second Malire Battalion
2.8 Kifaru Regiment
2.9 Chui Battalion
2.10 Marines

3. Airborne units
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Air and Seaborne Battalion
3.3 2nd Paratrooper Battalion
3.4 Airborne Battalion

4. Other units
4.1 Artillery Regiment
4.2 Signals
4.3 Artillery and Signals Regiment
4.4 Anti-Aircraft Detachment
4.5 Commandos
4.6 Striking Force
4.7 Presidential Escort
4.8 Military Police
4.9 Border Guards Unit
4.10 Army Transport Corps
4.11 Frogmen

5. Establishments
5.1 Infantry School
5.2 Paratrooper School
5.3 Signal Training School
5.4 Mechanised Training Wing
5.5 Ngoma training area
5.6 Army Ordnance Depot
5.7 Army Records Office
5.8 Army Pay and Pensions Office

6. Higher formations
6.1 Introduction
6.2 1st Infantry Brigade
6.3 Eastern Command
6.4 2nd Infantry Brigade
6.5 Southern Command
6.6 Western Command
6.7 Some sort of airborne brigade
6.8 Two mechanised brigades

7. Other matters
7.1 The unit codes on vehicle registrations

8. What units were doing what in the Kagera War?
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Various accounts of the cause of the Kagera war
8.3 Attestations of named units in the Kagera War
8.4 Some thoughts on the above entries
8.4.3 A lengthy and tedious digression on the activities of the Suicide Regiment and the Tiger Regiment after the fall of Masaka
8.4.4 Did the Suicide Regiment fight at Lukaya?
8.4.5 Did the Tiger Battalion fight at Tororo?

1. GENERAL MATTERS

1.1 Introduction and general comments

1.1.1 Before actually talking about the uniforms, I think something has to be said about the actual structure of the army. This is, in short, a fairly tortuous matter, worsened by the vagueness and sparseness of the source material, and the tendency of units to have one or several alternative names which Ugandans of the period used indiscriminately. I am aware of three published army lists: one in Cooper & Fontanellaz (dated to October 1978),[1] one on Wikipedia (covering the whole Amin period), and one in General Amin, dated March 1977,[2] which is reproduced wholesale in Ghosts of Kampala.[3] I, very presumptuously, attempt to offer a new and improved list here.

1.1.2 I am trying to stick to sources which are contemporary or, in my entirely subjective view, “good” in some other sense. I say this mainly by reference to the Wikipedia article, which makes heavy use of modern online Ugandan newspaper articles. I don’t discount these en masse, by any means, but I approach them cautiously. I take a generally positive view of Bernard Rwehururu’s book – it’s self-serving, and curiously unreflective, but he displays a good grasp of names and places, if sometimes not dates.

1.1.3 I assume actual, decisive, definitive answers to the many issues thrown up here are all lying in the archives in Kampala or elsewhere. Omara-Otunnu in his book quotes extensively from internal army memoranda etc., which he apparently found in the late 1980s at the “Uganda National Liberation Army Records Office” – where this is today, if anywhere, I do not know.

1.2 Naming of units

1.2.1 A particular point to keep in mind is how the terms “battalion”, “regiment” and “brigade” were employed. The terms “regiment” and “battalion” seem to have been used more or less interchangeably. I assume this is simply a consequence of the UA being organised along British lines – that is, battalions were tactical units whereas regiments were “identities”. For the purpose of this page, I also use the two words somewhat interchangeably, and broadly in line with how the sources use them – e.g. the armoured unit based at Camp Malire is invariably “the Malire Regiment”. I assume that all “regiments” were in fact single battalions unless the evidence suggests otherwise. At time of writing I can’t say for sure how many battalions made up (or were intended to make up) a brigade – three is my best guess.[4]

1.2.2 I have a curious notice from early 1974 – on 6 February, it was announced that the Defence Council had approved “new badges and names of all the regiments of the Uganda Armed Forces. The Council also dropped all colonial badges and names of the regiments. The new names of the regiments and their badges are to be announced soon”. This seems never to have been followed up with.[5]

1.3 Numbering of units

1.3.1 The “original” infantry battalions were numbered 1st-4th. The 4th (Simba) Infantry Battalion became the nucleus of the new Simba Mechanised Brigade in April 1973, and from that point seems to have been known as the 1st Simba Mechanised Regiment – “1st” presumably by reference to its status as the senior battalion/regiment in that brigade. The 2nd and 3rd Infantry Battalions are also attested towards the end of Amin’s reign as being “1st”, implying they too had become the nuclei of new brigades. Detail beyond this escapes me. Possibly they were “1st” in the sense of having become the senior battalion of the brigade they were in, rather than the parent of a new unit which was split off from them. This is all dealt with in more detail in the relevant sections.

1.3.2 Henry Kyemba, writing in 1977, makes an interesting reference to the “thirteen battalions” of the army – he excludes the military police and the ordnance depot from this.[6] I count twelve obvious ones – 1st-4th, Malire, Suicide, Kifaru, Chui, Air and Seaborne, Marine, 2nd Para, Commando. Probably the Artillery Regiment was the intended thirteenth.

1.3.3 The army list in General Amin/Ghosts of Kampala is dated specifically to March 1977. I can’t see any particular significance for this date, so I presume that, simply, the author must have had some document of that date he used as his reference. He also gives thirteen principal units, if we count the artillery and the “Paratroop Unit, Kampala” (see sections 3.1 and 3.5 for my thoughts on this unit) which he lists instead of the Commandos. He numbers the original battalions units as 1st-4th and doesn’t present them as the senior battalions of eponymous regiments.

1.4 Commanding officers

1.4.1 I should note here that my lists of commanding officers are intended to distinguish substantive commanding officers from “acting” ones – the sources have many references to this or that person, often a major, as “acting” commanding officer of a battalion/regiment. I have tried to keep the two lists separate but I’m sure in some cases I’ve misidentified acting commanding officers as de jure commanding officers.

1.4.2 I don’t have any confirmed instances of the tenure of an acting commanding officer overlapping with a substantive one, so it seems that acting ones were only appointed when the post was vacant.

1.5. Later enlargement and motorisation of the army

1.5.1 The army continued to expand —at least, on paper— throughout Amin’s reign. The original four battalions all seem to have been enlarged, and/or “mechanised”, to whatever extent, by the late 1970s. I deal with this in more detail in the relevant sections. The formation of the Suicide Regiment as a companion to the Simba Regiment is well attested, but the enlargement of the other three infantry regiments is more obscure. Tanks seem to have been in fairly short supply, but Cooper & Fontanellaz state that the USSR gave Amin 162 APCs (“primarily BTR-40s”) in late 1973-early 1974,[7] which would’ve been enough to equip about five battalions (by reference to a Soviet motorised rifle battalion of the 1970s, which I understand had about thirty-three APCs). So units attested from later in the Amin period like the “Eagle Gaddafi Mechanised Battalion” may indeed have been motorised, though presumably didn’t possess tanks or other heavy equipment.

1.5.2 Other new units, like the “Striking Force”, and the purported expeditionary force in Egypt,[8] seem to have been, at best, nominal.

1.6 Which units had tanks?

1.6.1 The easiest item is the Shermans.[9] Twelve of these were acquired from Israel, sometime before Amin came to power.[10] At the time of Amin’s coup, they belonged to the Malire Regiment. This unit still had them in 1976 (see section 2.6 below) and I’ve seen nothing to suggest they lost them subsequently.

1.6.2 The T-55s are very difficult. Cooper & Fontanellaz state that the USSR gave Amin 16 T-55 tanks in “late 1973 and 1974”.[11] Another source (of unclear provenance) says that, in March 1975, Uganda received “18 amphibian and ordinary tanks” from the USSR.[12] An August 1976 news report gives Uganda “27 Russian tanks.”[13] The largest number is from “sources” cited by the AFP in September 1974, claiming that the USSR provided Amin with “60 light tanks”.[14]

In the 1978 footage I take as evidence for giving T-55s to the Marines (see the next page), one turret number can be read: 726.[15] An undated photo in Cooper & Fontanellaz, conceivably of the same occasion, shows 739 and another one that’s very hard to read – 756 is my cautious interpretation.[16] If the numbers went up sequentially, this gives us at least 30 tanks. I have no evidence for this, however, and the numbering could’ve been done according to any number of systems.

As for which unit, or units, had T-55s:

• Cooper & Fontanellaz write that the Simba Regiment had “a company of” T-55s, without citing a source.[17]

• A March 1974 state radio broadcast describes the Suicide Regiment as having just received Soviet “tanks and APCs”.[18] The date matches well with the date of delivery given in Cooper & Fontanellaz. I have another reference, in July 1974, to Amin visiting the “tanks” of this unit.[19]

• Keesing's World News Archives contains a notice (of unclear provenance) that, in April 1975, the Malire Regiment was “known to have been equipped with Soviet armoured troop carriers and T-54 tanks”.[20]

• Tenuous visual evidence suggests that the Marine Regiment had T-55s – see the following page for my thinking on this. The textual evidence confirms that Marines did have tanks (see section 2.10 below) but doesn’t confirm what type.

• Cooper & Fontanellaz write that the victorious Tanzanians captured six T-55s at the Battle of Simba Hills on 11 February 1979. The authors’ order of battle on the Ugandan side is the Suicide Regiment (which they believe was the same unit as the Malire Regiment), and the Gaddafi battalion.[21] I deal with this notice much further down, in the Kagera War section – suffice to say up here I find it a little questionable.

• I have no visual evidence for assigning T-55s to the Simbas or the Suicides, or indeed any unit other than the Marines, with the enormous caveats that the visual evidence for the Uganda Army, in general, is sparse and frequently confusing; and, at the time of writing, I’m not even a little sure I know how to visually identify either the Simbas or the Suicides.

A complication is another radio broadcast, of April 1974,[22] where Amin says that, of his six mechanised battalions, only one is equipped with Soviet weapons. Taken literally, this means we have to give all the T-55s to one battalion. However, I think this entire statement of Amin’s is improbable – at that point it’s unlikely the army had six mechanised battalions,[23] and probably a vast majority of the army’s APCs etc were Soviet (see section 1.5.1 above), despite his denials. All very unclear.

1.6.3 Libya gave Amin 10 T-34s in c. July-August 1976.[24] Cooper & Fontanellaz assign these tanks to the Suicide Regiment, but they erroneously think the Suicide Regiment and the Malire Regiment were the same unit. However, if their source (not given) attributed them to the Suicide Regiment, I think this is plausible. The Malire Regiment is less likely, as it already had its Shermans. If the Suicide Regiment got tanks in 1976, does that imply they didn’t have tanks up to then? i.e. if they had tanks (i.e., T-55s) perhaps another, tank-less, unit would’ve been higher priority. Meanwhile Vita vya Kagera, which shows some abandoned Ugandan T-34s, possibly shows them at Mbarara (garrison of the Simbas) rather than Masaka (garrison of the Suicides), though this point isn’t at all clear, and my lack of Swahili means I can make nothing of the accompanying narration.

1.6.4 A relevant question is how large a Ugandan tank company was, or was intended to be. The Malire Regiment had 12 Shermans, and I’ve seen a reference to that regiment’s “tank squadron”, implying they were all grouped together in a single sub-unit.[25] As for the T-55s, my understanding is that a contemporary Soviet tank company had 10 tanks (nine plus the command tank). I’m not sure how large a contemporary British tank company (squadron?) was, but at the end of WWII it seems to have been 17 (15 plus two command tanks).[26] So, 16 T-55s could’ve been kept together to make a strong company, or split into two weak companies. 27 T-55s would make three only slightly under-strength companies, and 60 six or more companies.

Hopefully more information will emerge to help clear all this up.

1.7 Ethnic factors

1.7.1 As is well known, Amin purged the army of ethnic groups he considered disloyal, until, by the end of his tenure, West Nilers, Sudanese, and Zairians predominated.[27] Obote, in building up the army, had ensured it was filled with men from groups he trusted. What is currently unclear to me is how the ethnic composition worked on a regimental level. Was it officially envisaged, even if the policy was commonly disregarded, that regiments should draw recruits from the vicinity of their bases? And, later, when foreign recruits were brought in, were they assigned equally to all units, or predominantly to the praetorian ones?

The short answer is – I currently do not know.

1.8 The Army Chief of Staff

1.8.1 I have the following notices for this position:

• 3 August 1971: Acting COS Lt-Col Charles Arube replaced by Lt-Col Musa.[28]

• 30 December 1972: By this date the acting COS is Col ?Myangwesco (Francis Nyangweso, probably).[29]

• 20 June 1973: Col Charles Arube made COS.[30]

• Brig Ali Fadhul was acting COS at some point in or before 1973.[31]

• 1 January 1974: Brig Hussein Malera made acting COS.[32] He retires as acting COS on 4 May 1974.[33]

• Col Mustafa Adrisi had been acting COS since some point in earlier 1974, presumably replacing Brig Malera. On 1 September 1974 he is promoted to brigadier and made substantive COS.[34] He holds the role until January 1977.[35]

• 25 January 1977: Maj-Gen Isaac Lumago made acting COS.[36]

• 8 May 1978: by this date Maj-Gen Yusuf Gowon is acting COS.[37] He is confirmed in the position on 19 June.[38] On 11 December 1978 the state radio describes him as acting COS. Whether he was indeed demoted, or this is just one of those unaccountable things, I do not know.[39]

• 7 March 1979: Amin assumes the position personally.[40]

2. INFANTRY AND MECHANISED UNITS

2.1 1st Infantry Battalion (aka the Eagle Colonel Gaddafi Battalion, aka the Burma Battalion)

Name. The George VI Barracks at Jinja was renamed the “Gaddafi Barracks” at some point or other. The date of this eludes me – it was either c. late 1972, or January 1973 when Gaddafi first visited Uganda, or his second visit in March 1974. In this second visit Gaddafi visited the barracks and “opened” them, whatever that entailed.[41] This would thus seem the most obvious date for the renaming, but I have a reference to the renaming being in the works in September 1972 (as an expression of gratitude to Gaddafi for his supposed assistance in defeating the 1972 rebel incursion),[42] so perhaps it was done around the time of his first visit. I assume the “Eagle” title is of earlier date, in view of the other infantry battalions also having animal names, but the earliest attestation I currently have is November 1973.[43] I have a single attestation of “Eagle Gaddafi Mechanised Battalion” (in 1975)[44] – see the “history” subsection below. I’ve also seen “Burma Garrison”, a reference presumably to Amin’s purported service with the KAR there in WWII.[45]

History. Raised in 1895 as the Uganda Rifles (later, 4th Battalion King’s African Rifles, etc.). In December 1974 this unit was (I quote from the state radio) “inaugurated from a rifle [regiment] to a full mechanised regiment”.[46]

Events. “Scores” of Acholi and Langi soldiers massacred at the barracks in July 1971.[47]

Garrison. Jinja (perhaps as early as 1900 or so).[48]

Commanding Officers. Lt-Col. Oyok (-Jan 71).[49] Lt-Col Charles Arube (-Apr 72-).[50] Lt-Col. Isaac Maliyamungu (Nov 74-Apr 75).[51][52] Lt-Col. Hussein (Apr 75-Mar 77-).[53][54]

Acting Commanding Officers. Lt-Col. Sulaymani (-Mar 72).[55]

***

2.2 2nd Infantry Battalion (aka the Gonda Battalion)

Name. This is sometimes called the “Gondo” Battalion in the sources, but this seems to be simply a persistent error. In Swahili a “gonda” is a sort of lizard creature.

History. Raised 14 November 1963.[56] A “1st Gonda Regiment” is attested in March 1977[57] and November 1978.[58] I’ve so far seen no evidence of higher-numbered Gonda Battalions/Regiments, or a “Gonda Brigade”.

Events. Kenyan radio alleges a mutiny in February 1971.[59] Acholi and Langi soldiers massacred at the barracks sometime in mid-1971.[60]

Garrison. Moroto (November 1963).[61]

Commanding Officers. Lt-Col. Tom Loyira (-Jan 71).[62] Lt-Col. Ozo (-Jul 71).[63] Lt-Col. Ozo (again) (-Feb 73-).[64] Lt-Col. Abudalatiff (-Nov 76-Sep 77-).[65][66] Lt-Col. Yefusa Bananuka (-Nov 78-).[67]

***

2.3 3rd Infantry Battalion (aka the Tiger Battalion)

Name. This unit seems not to have had a Swahili animal name, oddly. 

History. Raised February 1965.[68] The 1978 Defence and Foreign Affairs Handbook refers to a “Tiger Regiment” of three battalions existing in 1978[69] -- this might well reflect some actual circumstances, to whatever degree of accuracy. A “1st Tiger Regiment” is attested in March 1973 and November 1978.[70][71] I’ve so far seen no evidence of higher-numbered Tiger Battalions/Regiments, or a “Tiger Brigade”.

Events. The unit participated in the September 1972 fighting.[72] Kenyan radio reported in July 1976 that the unit mutinied over pay arrears.[73] A mutiny in the unit in ?1978 was suppressed.[74]

Garrison. Mubende.

Commanding Officers. Lt-Col. Abwola (-Jan 71).[75] Lt-Col. Omaria/Omeria/Omareya (-Feb 73-Oct 73).[76][77] Lt-Col. ?Abdulla Buya or Abdullahi (Feb 74-Aug 76).[78][79]  Lt-Col. Yakobo Abiriga (Aug 76-Mar 79-).[80][81][82]

***

2.4 4th Infantry Battalion (aka the Simba Battalion)

Later, the Simba Mechanised Regiment (aka the 1st Simba Mechanised Regiment, aka the 1st Simba Mechanised Specialist Reconnaissance Regiment)

Name. “Simba” of course meaning “lion” in Swahili. Having been upgraded to a mechanised unit in April 1973[83] it was re-named the “Simba Mechanised Regiment”. It is later described as the “1st Simba Mechanised Regiment” – my presumption is that the “1st” is by reference to its position at that time as the senior unit in the Simba Mechanised Brigade. It might have even simultaneously been the “4th” (re: the infantry numbering) and the “1st” (re the Simba Mechanised Brigade numbering), vis-à-vis its use of “14 UA” vehicle registrations. In September 1972, the state radio made the rather curious claim that the battalion wished to re-name its barracks after Colonel Gaddafi but, having realised that the 1st Battalion had beaten them to it, instead proposed to re-name the barracks after Gaddafi’s mother(!). Amin, sensibly, declined to take this forward. In October 1972 (the closeness in time may not be coincidental), Amin reminded the battalion of the courage displayed in 1965 which had earned them the “Simba” title originally.[84]

History. Raised March 1965,[85] apparently predominantly from WWII veterans, to be an extra military presence in the west during the Congo Crisis.[86] Amin claimed that the unit fought under him in the West Nile area in February (sic) 1965, where with 800 men “armed with sticks” defeated a mercenary incursion from the Congo.[87] Upgraded to a mechanised unit in April 1973.[88] There was a “Simba Battalion” in Mbarara in 2008, and presumably still is today – whether this is (or regards itself as) a direct continuation of the Amin-era unit, I do not know.[89]

Events. “Scores” of Acholi and Langi soldiers massacred at the barracks in July 1971.[90] Two American journalists, researching this massacre, were also killed at the barracks, earning Amin some early bad publicity. The unit participated in the September 1972 fighting.[91] It may have been tangentially involved in the Arube affair, as it felt the need to assure Amin of its loyalty afterwards.[92] In November 1974 a training accident killed five and wounded twenty-five.[93]

Garrison. Mbarara.

Commanding Officers. Lt-Col. Ali Fadhul Wariss (Apr 71-May 73).[94] Lt-Col. Juma Baker aka Baker Tretre (May 74- by November 74).[95][96][97]

The 1974 International Commission of Jurists report said that Major Tretre disappeared in November 1973, and was presumed dead.[98] Amin rebutted this in June 1974, noting that he had promoted Baker to command of the Simba Battalion the previous month.[99] Rwehururu also recalls meeting Tretre around the time of his taking command of the Simbas. His card was marked, however, and he was killed by (and probably around) early November 1974.[100]

Anyway, we then have Col Juma Adeke (-Aug 75-).[101] Maj. Issa Fataki (-Mar 77-).[102] Lt-Col. Hussein ?Marijan (-Oct 77-).[103] Maj. Erifazi Sabila (-Sep 78-).[104] Lt-Col. Yusuf Adeke (-Nov 78-Mar 79).[105][106]

Acting Commanding Officers. Maj. Gowon (c. Sep 72).[107] Maj. Adek [Adeke?] (-Dec 73-Nov 74-).[108][109]

 ***

2.5 2nd Simba Mechanised Specialist Battalion

Later, the Revolutionary Suicide Mechanised Specialist Regiment[110]

Name. Originally the 2nd Simba Mechanised Specialist Battalion – “2nd” by reference to the “original” Simba Battalion (i.e. the 4th Infantry Battalion).[111] Re-named the Revolutionary Suicide Mechanised Specialist Regiment in February 1974.[112] Kyemba writes that the unit was “named solely for dramatic effect”.[113] Dennis Hills connects the name to Amin’s infatuation with the idea of Palestinian suicide attacks.[114]

History. First seen by me in May 1973, and presumably raised around that time, in connection with the formation of the Simba Mechanised Brigade.[115] This unit is taken as an alternate name of the Malire Regiment in Cooper & Fontanellaz, but this is not correct. It received Soviet armour (unclear exactly what, beyond a general reference to “tanks and APCs”) in March 1974.[116] The unit had Saladin armoured cars and tanks of an unspecified type in the Kagera War.[119] A “Masaka Mechanised Regiment” is attested in 1986, fighting for the UNLA against the NRA – whether that unit was connected lineally to the Suicides, I do not know.[120] A unit by that name existed in 2008, and presumably still exists today (having, presumably, made its peace with Museveni at some point, if it isn’t a new raising).[121]

Events. In September 1975 state media felt obliged to issue a rebuttal to claims in the Kenyan press that Lt-Col. Gore had tried to seize power while Amin was on a trip to Ethiopia.[117] In c. June 1976 a soldier was killed in Masaka, under unclear circumstances, and other soldiers rampaged against civilians for a while.[118]

Garrison. Masaka.

Commanding Officers. Lt-Col. Isaac Maliyamungu (May 73-Nov 73-).[122][123] Lt-Col. Christopher Gore (Feb 74-Mar 77-).[124][125][126] Lt-Col. Nasur Ezega (Oct 77-April1978).[127][128] Lt-Col. Tom Asiki or Akiki (May  78-Feb 79-).[129][130] Lt-Col. ?Ondeki (-Mar 79-). Perhaps this last was a misheard “Asiki”.[131]

Rwehururu evidently had some responsibility over the regiment in the Kagera War, but he was never formally its commanding officer.

***

2.6 5th Mechanised Specialist Reconnaissance Regiment (aka the Malire Regiment)

Name. The regiment was named after its base at Camp Malire, Kampala. “Malire” is apparently Luo for “booty” –  a reference presumably to the Kabaka’s palace at Lubiri, which was plundered and converted into the regimental barracks.[132] The name stuck to the unit even after it was transferred to Bombo in 1974.[133] Seemingly the name “Camp Malire” itself transferred to the new barracks at Bombo.[134]

History. Raised July 1967.[135] A “brigade reconnaissance company”, raised at some point in 1965,[136] may have been its ancestor. As well as its Shermans, Ferret armoured cars are attested in 1975.[137] The unit seems to have survived Amin, at least for a time – Omara-Otunnu has Godfrey Binaisa visiting it in May 1980.[138]

Events. This unit was instrumental in Amin’s coup in 1971. The commanding officer, Lt-Col. Akwanaga, was killed by his own soldiers during the coup.[139] In the aftermath of the coup the regiment was briefly commanded by Mustafa Adrisi, then a captain, in the absence of any more senior officers.[140] In March[141] 1971 “thirty-two senior Langi and Acholi officers were herded into a room and blown up with explosives”.[142] The unit participated in the September 1972 fighting.[143] In March 1974, a few days before the Arube affair, the unit rescued hostages from a plane which, having been hijacked by Ethiopian dissidents, was obliged by lack of fuel to land at Entebbe.[144] The unit mutinied and attempted to overthrow Amin during the Arube affair.[145] We read in one account that the regiment was “broken up” after its participation in the Arube affair,[146] which is incorrect as far as I’m aware. The regiment provided the guard of honour for the Kampala OAU summit in April, a week after the Arube affair,[147] and it still had its most potent hardware, its Shermans, in January 1976.[148] The regiment was sent to guard the hostages at Entebbe, and there fought the Israelis. It deployed APCs but not, apparently, tanks.[149] In February 1977, part of the spectacle around  Archbishop Luwum’s alleged coup plot was the production of a Malire Regiment soldier who made a long confession of his anti-Amin sentiments. More interestingly for this purpose, he mentioned that “some of our APCs have batteries which have run down”, making them difficult to start. Elements of the regiment made a fairly desultory attempt at overthrowing Amin in June 1977.[150] State radio claimed that 10,000 new recruits passed out in October 1978.[151] This is implausibly large but must suggest an expansion of some sort.

Garrison. Perhaps originally in Bamunanika[152] or Jinja.[153] Camp Malire, Lubiri, Kampala from July 1967.[154] The regiment was obliged to relocate to Bombo[155] in 1974 following the Arube affair. It was still there in 1978.[156]

Commanding Officers. Lt-Col. Augustine Akwanaga or Ogwang (-Jan 71).[157][158] Lt-Col. Musa (-Jul 72-June 73).[159][160][161] Lt-Col. Eli or Elly Aseni (June 73-).[162] Lt-Col. Godwin Sule (Dec 73-Jul 76-).[163][164][165] Lt-Col. Juma Ali (?Butabika) (-June 76-Mar 77-).[166][167] Lt-Col. Juma Ali (?Butabika) (again, apparently) (-Sep 78-Nov 78-).[169][170]

Acting commanding officers. Capt. Mustafa Adrisi (Jan 71-).[171] Lt-Col. Isaac Maliyamungu (-Mar 74-).[172]

***

2.7 The alleged second Malire Battalion

David Martin, who was well-informed on Ugandan matters, writes in his General Amin that after the Arube affair “the bulk of the troops at Malire were moved out to Bombo… and a second Malire Mechanised Battalion [note: “second”, not “2nd”], drawn mainly from Sudanese mercenaries, was created.”[173] The reference might perhaps be to the Marines – as a well-equipped and armoured praetorian unit, of strongly “Nubian” composition, one could regard them as a second Malire Battalion spiritually, if not literally. He doesn’t list an additional Malire unit in his March 1977 army list.

***

2.8 The Kifaru Mechanised Specialist Reconnaissance Regiment

Name. Swahili for “Rhinoceros”. This has a “word salad” sort of name – the longest I have seen is “Kifaru Mechanised Specialist Reconnaissance Regiment.”[174]

History. Obscure. First seen by me in January 1972.[175] An announcement of promotions in early 1974 mentions the “Kifaru Mechanised Specialist Regiment” and, in the same sentence, the “Kifaru Mechanised Battalion”. Meanwhile another announcement of promotions, from 1977, has the major acting as commanding officer of the “regiment” promoted to lieutenant-colonel and made commanding officer “of that battalion” – this implies a single-battalion unit, surely.[176] At one point in his rather combative (and not wholly coherent) testimony to the 1994 human rights commission, the former Gen. Mustafa Adrisi commented: “…in a battalion, there are different battalions, for example, in Kifaro, there was APC – the Armed Personnel Carriers.” [sic!][177]

Garrison. Bondo seems to have been the unit’s headquarters.[178] In 1975 there were “units” in Bondo, Koboko and Moyo – some distance apart, but all in the West Nile area.[179] An “A Company” is attested at Koboko in April 1973.[180]

Commanding officers. Lt-Col. Mustapha (Adrisi?) (-Jan 73--Jan 74).[181][182][183] Lt-Col. Gabriel (Jan 74-).[184] Lt-Col Lumago (Nov 74-Jan 75).[185][186] Lt-Col. Eskol (Jan 75-Mar 77-).[187][188][189] Lt-Col. Mukiri (1977 sometime).[190]

***

2.9 Chui Battalion

Name. Swahili for “Leopard”. Was known as the “Chui Reconnaissance Regiment” in December 1974.[191]

History. Raised in 1974.[192] There’s a scene in Idi Amin Dada Autoportrait where he awards wings to air force pilots, etc., in a ceremony at Gulu. I think this can be dated to 16 February 1974.[193] There’s a march-past by an oddly-dressed army unit, where some men have blue lanyards and others red. Possibly this is a very early view of this battalion, with the men still wearing the uniforms of the units they came from. A confusing radio announcement of December 1974 stated that the “Chui Reconnaissance Regiment, Gulu [has been upgraded to] a full reconnaissance regiment”.[194] What it had been, prior to that upgrade, is unclear. “Reconnaissance” in the Ugandan Army context seems to have meant the unit had vehicles – what types, and now many, I have no idea.

Events. The unit fought skirmishes with State Research Bureau and Marines men in 1978.[195][196]

Garrison. Gulu (1974).[197]

Commanding officers. Lt-Col. Yefusa Bananuka (its establishment in 1974-Mar 77-).[198][199] Lt-Col. ?Farouk Sebhi (Dec. 78).[200]

***

2.10 The Marines

Name. On the upper sleeves of their dress uniforms they wore titles reading "Uganda Army Marines". Southall calls them the “Bugolobi Marine Brigade”.[201] Contemporary radio broadcasts generally refer simply to the “Marines” or even the “Marine”.

History. The unit seems not to have existed in c. late 1972.[202] The 1978 Defence and Foreign Affairs Handbook has the unit raised in 1973, which certainly fits the other evidence.[203] The earliest dated mention I can find is of 1 January 1974 – there it is listed among other units and not presented as a new raising.[204] By 1975 the unit had “armoured personnel”.[205] January 1978 footage has Amin presenting a colour to this unit, which might imply some sort of recent expansion – the earliest appearance of their blue dress uniform seems to have been around this date also. That this unit was commanded by officers more senior to the typical lieutenant-colonel implies it was larger than just a single battalion. At the outbreak of the Kagera war the regiment was apparently “all Nubians”.[206] A very late (February 1979) broadcast refers to the “Tanks Regiment of the Marines”[207] – in previous drafts of this page I had assumed this was a fantasy, but in fact the Marines did have tanks (albeit, surely not a “regiment” of them).[208] I don’t know what model the tanks were, but I think the visual evidence suggests T-55s. See the next page for my reasoning. Rwehururu says that the Marines were the “most trusted and best equipped regiment” at the time of the Kagera War. Allen describes them as a praetorian unit.[209]

Events. The unit had a leading role in suppressing the Arube coup. The unit sent a contingent, including tanks, to guard the hostages at Entebbe, and there fought the Israelis.[210] The tanks were, it seems, positioned ineptly, and unable to contribute to the fighting.[211]

Garrison. Bugoloobi, in Kampala.

Commanding officers. Allen punctiliously notes that this unit used army, not naval, ranks.[212] Lt-Col. Taban Lupayi (Jan 74-).[213] Lt-Col./Col. Ibrahim (-Jan 75-Aug 75-).[214][215] Lt-Col/Col./Brig. Taban Lupayi (-Jul 76-May 78 or at least Dec 78).[216][217] The state radio announced in May 1978 that Lupayi had been promoted to brigadier and made commander of Western Command, but the same source, in September 1978, describes him as c/o of the Marines,[218] and in December 1978, describes him as acting Chief of Staff and “commander of the Marines”.[219]  Unclear.

The Voice of Uganda claims a “Col. Sahuni” was c/o in July 1975, which I think must be a mistake.[220]

Acting commanding officers. Maj. Juma (-Mar 74-).[221]

3. AIRBORNE UNITS

3.1 Introduction

I found these difficult units to pin down. My working theory (and I’ll spare the reader the fatiguing approach to this conclusion) is that Uganda came to possess three airborne battalions – the Air and Seaborne Battalion, the 2nd Paratrooper Battalion, and the “Airborne Battalion”. Taken together this is a rather curious taxonomy, but I think it’s the only way to properly deal with the source material. It also produces a result which aligns with the army list in General Amin/Ghosts of Kampala, which I consider a strong argument in its favour. Trying to treat the Airborne Battalion as an alternate name for one of the other two battalions has simplicity and a certain degree of horse sense in its favour, and that was the approach I had previously taken, but it led me into terminal confusion.

The nucleus of the airborne arm seems to have been an experimental 100-man unit which is attested in December 1968. It was seemingly part of the Malire Regiment at that stage.[222] Omara-Otunnu dates the establishment of the first airborne unit to September 1969.[223]

 ***

3.2 Air and Seaborne Battalion[224]  

Name. This unit seems to have worn conventional paratrooper-style uniforms – in what capacity they were “seaborne” is unclear to me. That the next paratrooper unit to be raised was numbered the “2nd battalion” implies that this unit should be considered the “1st battalion”, but I have never seen it so called in the source material.

History. Raised September 1969,[225] presumably out of the experimental unit described above. It apparently still existed in 1983.[226]

Garrison. Tororo (by January 1972).[227]

Commanding officers. Lt-Col. Toloko (-Mar 71-Jan. 72-).[228][229] Lt-Col. Juma Doka (May 73-Aug 76).[230][231] Lt-Col. Abdullahi (Aug 76-Jul 78).[232][233]

Acting commanding officers. Maj. Juma Doka (-Jan 73-May 73).[234][235] On his retirement Abdullahi was replaced by an acting c/o whose name I don’t have.[236]

Events. The unit participated in the September 1972 fighting.[237] There was possibly an abortive mutiny over “pay and conditions” in November 1974.[238][239] A mutiny by some men of the unit over “losses of privileges in recent months and wages arrears” c. 30 September 1978 was quickly put down.[240]

***

3.3 2nd Paratrooper Battalion

Name. 2nd Paratrooper Battalion, Regiment, etc., is standard. The unit is very occasionally called the “Mountains of the Moon Battalion”.[241]

History. I don’t have a notice of the raising of this unit, but state radio has a “2nd Para Regiment” participating in the September 1972 fighting, so evidently it existed by then.[242] State radio mentioned the formation of the “new airborne brigade” in September 1971,[243] which might be an oblique reference to the raising of this battalion.

Garrison. Fort Portal (by May 1973).[244]

Commanding officers. Lt-Col. John Ona/Onna/Onaah (May 73-).[245] Lt-Col. Yerukamu (Jan 74-Jan 75).[246][247] Lt-Col. Galla, V.C. M.C. (Jan 75-Mar 77-).[248][249]

Acting commanding officers. Maj. John Onna (-Mar 73-).[250]

 ***

3.4 “Airborne Battalion”

Name. The state radio called this unit simply the “Airborne Battalion” or the “Airborne Regiment”. The army list in General Amin/Ghosts of Kampala, which is dated March 1977 calls it the “Paratroop Unit, Kampala”. In the order of precedence it should of course be the “3rd paratrooper battalion”, but that name never appears.

History. Unclear. The state radio mentions an “airborne unit at Malire Barracks” in November 1972, which may be this unit,[251] although it could be a reference instead to the Paratrooper School, which was then at Camp Malire (see section 5.2). On 12 November 1974 the state radio announced the formation of a “new full airborne battalion” in Kampala.[252] This is probably the likeliest date of its establishment.

Garrison. Kampala, presumably.

Commanding officers. Col. Dusman Sabuni (Jan 75-Jul 75-).[253][254] In July 1975 Sabuni was made a government minister, but he retained his command of the battalion, at least to begin with.[255] Lt-Col. Godwin Sule (Dec 76-Dec 78-).[256][257]

4. OTHER UNITS

4.1 Artillery Regiment

How this unit worked, or was intended to work, I’m not sure. The unit title suggests some sort of artillery park or divisional artillery. In the Kagera War, it seems to have fought in the theatre as a discrete unit, apart from some elements (perhaps the training company, etc.) which remained at Masindi.

History. Date of raising unclear. Was in existence by September 1972.[258]

Events. The unit participated in the September 1972 fighting.[259]

Garrison. Masindi (by August 1975).[260]

Commanding officers. Lt-Col. Emmanuel Ogwa (-Jan 71).[261] Lt-Col Muhammad or Magamuo Aziz (-Jun 72-Jul 73).[262][263] Lt-Col. Abdul Kisuule (-May 74-Nov 78-).[264][265]

Acting commanding officers. Capt. John David Karui (Jul 73-Aug 73).[266] Maj. Kisule (Aug 73-).[267]

***

4.2 Signals

History. Unclear to me. There was a signals unit at GHQ in August 1964[268], and later a “brigade signals squadron” was raised in April 1965.[269]

Garrison. Jinja (1965).[270]

***

4.3 Artillery and Signals Regiment

This unit appears in Cooper & Fontanellaz’ list. So far I’ve never seen the name “Artillery and Signals Regiment” used in contemporary sources, but I don’t believe I’ve ever seen the Signals attested as a separate unit after Omara-Otunnu’s mention of its formation, and the army list in General Amin/Ghosts of Kampala describes the “Chief Signals Officer” as a position within the Artillery Regiment. So my best guess is that the army’s signals function above battalion level was performed by the Artillery Regiment.

***

4.4 Anti-Aircraft Detachment

History. Raised 1 July 1965. Subsequent history unclear.[271]

***

4.5 The Commandos

This unit is rarely attested. I can find precisely zero mentions of it during the Kagera War. A 1974 New York Times item gives an interesting hint of this unit’s functions – it, apparently, “[guards] strategic installations throughout the country”.[272]

Name. The official name of this unit seems to have been the “Special Commando Division”.[273][274] A contemporary CIA telegram calls it the “Commando Battalion”,[275] and, if it was able to be commanded by a major (below), then presumably it was indeed battalion-sized.

History. State radio described a “Commando Unit” in November 1968.[276] A “new commando battalion” is attested in May 1973, having just returned from training abroad.[277]

Events. Something happened with this unit in November 1974. The 11 November New York Times, citing Tanzanian sources, reported that the Commandos revolted over lack of pay and food, and attempted to overthrow Amin.[278] Otunnu, on the other hand, claims that Lugbara members of the Suicide Regiment and other unspecified units revolted, and they were put down by the Commandos.[279] Both sources are seemingly trying to describe the same episode, as they give the same death toll, of approximately fifteen. Otunnu writes that the revolt broke out at the barracks at Mbuya, where I believe the Commandos were based. This perhaps makes it more likely the Commandos were on the pro-mutiny side, not the anti-mutiny one, though on the other hand it could’ve been a situation where the Lugbara component of the Commandos (if there was one) revolted but the remainder stayed loyal. All very unclear.

Garrison. Mbuya, Kampala(?)[280]

Commanding officers. Maj. Ibrahim (June 73-).[281]

***

4.6 Uganda Striking Force, aka the Suicide Striking Force

This is a surreal unit encountered in late source material. In short, it seems to have been a propaganda phantom which Amin could brandish to demonstrate his pan-Africanist credentials. Whether it existed only on paper, or was actually got up, I do not know.

“Shaba I” broke out in March 1977, and it was quickly rumoured that Uganda was providing military support to Zaire. Amin denied the allegations, declaring high-mindedly that “he never had sent, and never would send, ‘arms or troops to an African country to kill fellow Africans.’”[282] He changed his mind a few weeks later, and dispatched a “Suicide Striking Force” to Shaba on 28 April. For all of three days, as it returned to Uganda on 30 April.[283] At this point, it was commanded by Lt-Col. Francis Itabuka.[284] Wikipedia, citing two sources I don’t have access to, says that the Force was “symbolic”.

On 28 March 1978, with Shaba II in the air, Amin said that he could not “sit by and see the enemies of President Mobutu destroy Zaire”, and this was why he had “had to send members of the Uganda Striking Force to Zaire last year, when Zaire was invaded from the Shaba Province.”[285]

By June 1978 the Force had been re-branded as the “Zimbabwe Striking Force”, men “highly trained in military tactics and [specialised] in operating Soviet, Western, Chinese and NATO arms”. Its role was, of course, to liberate Rhodesia.[286]

The CIA Foreign Broadcast Information Service report of 10 July 1978 quotes a news wire from Nairobi relating to a purported 8 July attempt at overthrowing Amin, which went nowhere. One sentence reads, “President Amin, backed by the recently formed ‘Uganda Striking Force’, has repeatedly stressed that he can block any attempt to overthrow him.”[287]

In the 21 September 1978 instalment of the Voice of Uganda we read that the Force comprises six battalions, all based at Ngoma training camp, “whose purpose is to fight in any part of Africa.” The entire Force is commanded by one Lt. Guya – “which has shown that a Ugandan lieutenant can do the work of a general”, Amin is quoted as saying.

Note that this unit is not to be confused with the “Suicide Strike Command”, an air force unit.

 ***

4.7 Presidential Escort

First met by me in April 1977, where its members are described as undergoing training at the Paratrooper School.[288] State radio claimed it participated in the Kagera war[289] and offers a curious notice of a lady member, who is also Amin’s driver, impressing people with her ability to shoot while driving.[290] Wikipedia has a couple of modern Ugandan newspaper interviews with veterans of the Amin era which mention the “Presidential Guard” or the “Presidential Guard Unit”. I lack any more information.

 ***

4.8 Military Police

History. Raised 1 January 1967.[291] In 1973 it was commanded by a colonel and seems to have been referred to as a “brigade”.[292] Individual posts seem to have been commanded by majors[293] down to lieutenants[294]

Headquarters. Makineye, Kampala (by November 1973).[295]

Commanding officers. Col. Ozo (-Aug 73-)[296]. Lt-Col./Col. Hussein Malera (-Dec 72-Dec 73).[297][298] Col. Gabriel Yoga (-Mar-Jun 77).[299][300] There was some sort of restructure in June 1977: “Amin directed that the Military Police would come under the Office of the President and would ‘in no way be under any commanding officer at all.” Whatever exactly that meant in practice.[301]

***

4.9 Border Guards Unit

History. Raised September 1969.[302] Subsequent history unclear. It apparently still existed in the Kagera War – I had vaguely wondered if the Kifaru Battalion had been a replacement for it.[303]

Headquarters. Gulu (September 1969).[304]

Commanding Officers. Lt-Col. Aboma Ayumu (-Jan 71).[305] Lt-Col. Mustafa (-Oct 72-).[306]

 ***

4.10 Army Transport Corps

No details. Existed by the time of the Kagera War.[307]

 ***

4.11 Frogmen

These men can be seen, somewhat incongruously, bringing up the rear in a January 1975 military parade. The Jinja fire brigade apparently had a frogmen unit, who may be the men in question.[308]

5. ESTABLISHMENTS

5.1 Infantry School, aka the Infantry Training Wing[309]

Location. Rwehururu puts it at Jinja in the late 1960s.[310] In Kabamba by July 1973.[311]

Commandants. Lt-Col. Langoya (-Jan 71).[312] Lt-Col. Charles Arube (-Aug 72-Jan or Feb 73).[313][314] Lt-Col. Michael ?Oluo Mondo (-Jul 73).[315] Lt-Col. ?Muyinda (Jan 74-).[316] Lt-Col. ?Mawadri (-Aug 76-).[317]

 ***

5.2 Paratrooper School

History. First seen by me in June 1973.[318] This institution makes a memorable appearance in Idi Amin Dada Autoportrait.

Location. Camp Malire in March 1973.[319] Had moved to Fort Portal by December 1973.[320]

Commandants. Maj. Tell (-Sep 71-).[321] Maj./Lt-Col. Bunyenyezi (-Dec 72-June 73).[322][323] Maj./Lt-Col. Sabuni (June 73-Nov 74-).[324][325]

I have an unaccountable mention of a Lt-Col. Onna being commandant in December 1973, in the middle of Lt-Col. Sabuni’s tenure.[326]

 ***

5.3 Signal Training School.

No details.[327]

 ***

5.4 Mechanised Training Wing

Location. Bombo.[328]

Commandants. Maj./Lt-Col. Ali (-Dec 72-Jun 73).[329][330]

 ***

5.5 Ngoma training area

This isn’t met with in earlier material, so may have been a later establishment.

Location. Ngoma.[331]

 ***

5.6 Army Ordnance Depot

History. Formed 1 July 1965.[332] I had assumed this was simply some sort of location and associated arrangements, as the name suggests, but it seems to have in fact been a discrete unit of sorts.[333] It seems to have had a high turnover of commanding officers, and may have been seen as a kind of reserve posting for lieutenant-colonels while they waited for reassignment.

Location. Magamaga.[334]

Commanding Officers. Lt-Col. John Ebitu (-Jan 71).[335] Lt-Col. Ochirri (-Aug 72-).[336] Lt-Col. Barnabas Kili (-May 73).[337] Lt-Col. Christopher Gore (-Nov 73-).[338] Brigadier [Mah…a] (-Mar 74-).[339] Lt-Col Isaac Maliyamungu (-Apr 74-).[340]

 ***

5.7 Army Records Office

History. Formed 1 July 1965.[341]

 ***

5.8 Army Pay and Pensions Office

History. Formed 1 July 1965.[342]

6. HIGHER FORMATIONS

6.1 Introduction

Early source material refers consistently to a 1st and 2nd Brigade. The 2nd Brigade became the Simba Mechanised Brigade in 1973 – see section 6.4 below.

The system of geographical “Commands” existed in early 1973,[343] and there seems to have been a restructure in November 1974, which resulted in five Commands,[344] presumably the compass directions plus a fifth one somewhere. The Commands are occasionally referred to as “Brigades”, and they seem to have been synonymous for practical purposes, but I have a late notice of the 1st Infantry Brigade (November 1978 – section 6.2 below) so perhaps there was some technical distinction between Brigades and Commands.

 ***

6.2 1st Infantry Brigade

History. Formed August 1968.[345]

Headquarters. Mbale (August 1968).[346]

Constituent units. In mid-1972 this contained the 1st and 2nd Infantry Battalions.[347] A notice elsewhere (relating to January 1972) suggests it also contained the Air and Seaborne Battalion.[348] It still existed, and still had the Gonda Battalion in it, in November 1978.[349]

Commanding officers. Col. Mesuera Arach (-Jan 71).[350][351] Lt-Col. William Ndahendekire (-Jan. 72-Mar 72).[352][353] Lt-Col. Suleiman (-Jul 72-).[354] Lt-Col. Charles Arube (-Feb 73-).[355] Col. Ozo (May 73-Dec 73-).[356][357] Col. Mustapha Adrisi (Jan 74-Jun or Jul 74).[358][359] Col. Isaac Maliyamungu (Apr 75-).[360] Lt-Col. Abdalla Tiff aka Abdul Latif aka Abdulatif Tiyua (-Sep 78-Jan 78-).[361][362][363]

Acting Commanding Officers. Lt-Col. Sulaymani (Mar 72-).[364]

 ***

6.3 Eastern Brigade, aka Eastern Command

Likely this was an alternative name for the 1st Infantry Brigade. I list it separately in the absence of an explicit statement to this effect. If the 1st Infantry Brigade had the 1st and 2nd Infantry Battalions, and the Air and Seaborne Battalion, it certainly could be considered “eastern”, based on where those units were garrisoned.

History. Was in existence by March 1977.[365]

Headquarters. I treat the modern Ugandan newspaper sources cautiously, but one appears to say that Mbale was the headquarters of this unit in 1979, in which case the identification with the 1st Infantry Brigade is probably certain.[366]

Commanding Officers: Col. Gowon (-Jan 75-Mar 77-).[367][368]  Mustapha Adrisi, with whatever rank he then held, had it at some point c. 1977.[369]

Constituent units. Avirgan & Honey write that, in March 1978, anti-Amin exile units tried to capture the Air and Seaborne Battalion’s barracks at Tororo. They were beaten off by that battalion, with reinforcements arriving “from Mubende… and from the Kampala Road”.[370] Mubende hosted the Tiger Battalion, and the reference to the Kampala Road is perhaps to the Gaddafi Battalion at Jinja? Anyway, state radio credited the recapture to the Eastern Brigade, implying that some or all of the units just named belonged to it.[371]

***

6.4 2nd Infantry Brigade

Later, the Simba Mechanised Brigade

History. Formed August 1968.[372] Re-named and re-organised as the “Simba Mechanised Brigade” in May 1973.[373]

Headquarters. Nakasero (August 1968).[374] In May 1973 it was moved from Mbarara to Masaka.[375]

Constituent units. At c. the start of 1973 this contained the 3rd and 4th Infantry Battalions.[376] Upon its reorganisation as the Simba Mechanised Brigade in May 1973, the 2nd Simba Mechanised Battalion (the future Suicide Mechanised Regiment) was added.[377] I don’t know if the 3rd Infantry Battalion left the brigade or not at this point.

Commanding Officers. Col. Ali Fadhul (May 73-Aug 73).[378][379] Lt-Col. Gowon (Aug 73-).[380]

Acting Commanding Officers. Maj. Maliyamungu (-Oct 72-Mar 73).[381][382] Lt-Col Arube (-Dec 72-).[383]

 ***

6.5 Southern Command

History. Attested in March 1973[384] and November 1978.[385] In March 1973[386] and November 1974[387] the Simba Battalion was in it.

Commanding officers: Lt-Col. Juma Oris (Dec 74-).[388]

 ***

6.6 Western Brigade, aka Western Command

“Brigade” and “Command” are both used in contemporary sources.[389]

History. Was in existence by March 1977.[390]

Constituent units. Unclear. Yorokamu Tizihwayo is attested as the Brigade’s commander during the Kagera War. Yoweri Museveni’s autobiography, which I regret having not had the pleasure of reading, apparently claims that Tizihwayo was in command of the 2nd Parachute Battalion at the battle of Gayaza.[391] After his death, command of the Brigade fell to Yakobo Abiriga, who had previously been commander of the Tiger Battalion. There’s no particular reason why command should’ve devolved to another officer in the Brigade, but the two battalions were stationed fairly close together and could both fairly be described as “western”, so perhaps it’s a reasonable guess. For the Tiger Battalion to be in this brigade, presumably it had to first be removed from the 2nd Brigade, which perhaps happened when that became the Simba Brigade.

Commanding Officers: Brigadier Yorakam Tizihwayo (Jan 75-Mar 77-his death in late March or April 1979).[392][393][394][395] Lt-Col.(?) Yakobo Abiriga (after Tizihwayo’s death).[396]

The state radio announced in May 1978 that command had been given to Brigadier Taban Lupayi.[397] If this is correct (and presumably it is) he must have given it back to Tizihwayo subsequently. Unclear.

***

6.7 Some sort of airborne brigade

State radio in September 1971 referred to a “new airborne brigade”,[398] and in March 1972 referred to a “Paratroops Command”, of equal status to the army and air force, commanded by a major-general.[399] This formation is never heard of again.

***

6.8 Two mechanised brigades

Quoting from the state radio, 27 April 1974: “President Amin announced the formation of two mechanised brigades, composed of six battalions. Five of the battalions have been fully equipped. One of the five battalions has been equipped with Russian mechanised arms, whereas the other four have been equipped with weapons from other countries”.[400] I’m doubtful that much, if any, of this is accurate. However, to take it at face value, of the two brigades, one is presumably the (already-existing) Simba Mechanised Brigade. The identity of the other is unclear. The Soviet-armed battalion is probably whichever one got the T-55s.

7. OTHER MATTERS

7.1 The unit codes on vehicle registrations

I might appropriately put this here, I think.

In the Cooper & Fontanellaz book, they state that the first two digits of the vehicle number plates correspond to the number of the unit. This certainly appears to be true some of the time — the unit which (from other evidence) we know to be the (5th) Malire Regiment seems to use “05 UA” plates in the footage, at least sometimes.

I offer some qualifications, however:

• I have never seen “01-04 UA” in photographs or footage.

• The numbering sequence in unit titles only goes up to 5, the Malire Regiment. We seem to have a second numbering sequence, 1-2, within the Simba Mechanised Brigade (see sections 2.4 and 2.5 above). All other units seem to have been un-numbered, except for the “2nd Paratrooper Battalion”. Meanwhile, the numbers seen on vehicle registrations go up to at least 25. So, presumably, after 05 UA, the system for assigning codes to units cannot have been “linear”.

• Different pieces of footage show a Land Rover with towed howitzer, and a military police Toyota, both with 09 UA plates. This would seem to suggest that a single code could be used by more than one unit, unless 09 UA was the “miscellaneous and other” code, or some such.

Rather difficult to know what to make of this. I am sure there was a system here, but on the evidence available I can’t reconstruct it. Most importantly, I don’t think there’s any prospect of success in trying to use the codes seen in the source material as a basis for identifying the units seen using those codes.

For reference, the codes I believe I’ve seen are:

• 05UA (Malire Regiment)

• 06UA (jeeps, and possibly some Malire Regiment vehicles)

• 07UA (jeeps, SKOTs with black diamond insignia)

• 08UA (jeeps driven by Amin himself, Malire Regiment jeeps)

• 09UA (Land Rover with towed howitzer, military police Toyota)

• 14UA (BTR-152s marked to the 1st Simba Regiment)

• 17UA (SKOTs)

• 24UA (a Mercedes-Benz belonging to Brigadier Tizihwayo, sometime commander of the Western Brigade)

• 25UA (a jeep)

7.2 Abdallah Nasur

I cannot find any mention, anywhere, of what army unit the notorious Abdallah Nasur belonged to. The point has some minor uniformological significance, as Derek Peterson’s Unseen Archive of Idi Amin includes a photo of him wearing a small badge with the insignia of the unit I take to be the Commando Battalion. Madanjeet Singh’s Culture of the Sepulchre claims Nasur was c/o of the Suicide Regiment, until he was fired “for his failure to bring to Amin’s notice a petty incident”. Unfortunately, Singh has confused Abdallah Nasur with Lt-Col. Nasur Ezega, who was indeed relieved of his command of the Suicide Regiment, in April 1978, for “failing to bring to the notice of the authorities an incident involving civilians and soldiers”, as the state radio carefully phrased it.[400A]

 8. WHAT UNITS WERE DOING WHAT IN THE KAGERA WAR?

8.1 Introduction

8.1.1 What follows is a compilation of mentions I have seen of a named Ugandan unit doing anything during the Kagera War. I’ve also added mentions of armour, and of Amin’s personal whereabouts. These entries are presented mostly indiscriminately, without much commentary or attempts to assess their accuracy, even in cases where one entry seems to manifestly contradict another. I fully intend to include an evaluation of some sort eventually, but for now I simply present the data as I find it. I emphasise – this is “raw material” and not any kind of finished treatment.

8.1.2 Many of the notices here come from the state radio, a source which should, to say the least, be treated with circumspection.

8.1.3 In preparing this list, I read through Avirgan & Honey before Cooper & Fontanellaz. To avoid duplication, I haven’t included any Cooper & Fontanellaz items which appear to be directly lifted from Avirgan & Honey.

8.1.4 Cooper & Fontanellaz, very unfortunately, think that the Suicide Regiment and the Malire Regiment were the same unit. This is why I use “Suicide or Malire Regiment” language in some notices here.

***

8.2 Various accounts of the cause of the Kagera war

8.2.1 In the context of anti-Tanzanian war frenzy, Juma Butabika started the war on his own initiative, invading the Kagera with his Malire Regiment and perhaps also the Simba Battalion. Amin was obliged to sanction Butabika’s actions lest he seem unable to control his generals.[401]

8.2.2 The Chui Battalion and Simba Battalion mutinied for this or that reason. Amin, having failed to trick them into fighting each other, ordered them into the Kagera, where they could satiate themselves with some looting.[402]

8.2.3 The Chui Battalion mutinied, looking to overthrow Amin and replace him with Mustafa Adrisi. Amin ordered the Military Police and State Research Bureau to suppress them.  They failed. The Simba Battalion was also mutinous, and Amin ordered the Chui Battalion to suppress them, hoping the units would wipe each other out. They however refused to fight each other, obliging Amin to send in the Marines to deal with them. They failed. Amin then sent the Marines and, for some reason, also the Malire Regiment, into the Kagera, where they could recover their morale with some looting.[403]

8.2.4. Deserters, possibly from the Simba Battalion, fled into the Kagera. Amin ordered the Suicide Battalion and Simba Battalion to pursue them, and this inadvertently started the war.[404]

***

8.3 Attestations of named units in the Kagera War

To make my life easier here, the sub-paragraphs aren’t numbered. Hopefully the dates make the material tolerably organised.

11 October: 20 soldiers of the Simba Battalion are attacked by Tanzanians in the Gombolola area [state radio].[405]

12 October: a small detachment of the Simba Battalion engages Tanzanian forces somewhere in the Nakivale or Isingiro area, Uganda [state radio].[406]

12 October: the Simba Battalion is attacked by Tanzanians and loses two APCs [state radio].[407]

13 October: the Simba Battalion suffers “tensions and incidents” as Tanzanian forces approach Mbarara. The Air and Seaborne Battalion at Tororo (very far away from the Tanzanian border, close to Kenya) is also mutinous [Kenyan radio].[408]

17 October: the Simba Battalion engages Tanzanian forces in Kasese (sic) and Kigagati [state radio].[409]

22 October: Amin visits the border. He extends condolences to the relatives of recently killed Chui Regiment members [state radio].[410]

22 October: “two regiment-sized task forces” advance into Tanzania – one, under Lt-Col. Butabika, with Shermans; the other, under Lt-Col. Kisuule, with T-55s. Butabika was commander of the Malire Regiment, so him having Shermans makes sense. Kisuule however was commander of the Artillery Regiment – I have no evidence this unit had T-55s (though the position with the T-55s is deeply unclear, as noted above) and, if they didn’t, it is curious a Lieutenant-Colonel would be commanding the armour of a different regiment, although if he had the ear of Amin no doubt his formal rank was relatively irrelevant [C&F].[411]

26 October: the Malire Regiment is attacked by Tanzanian forces at Mutukula [state radio].[412]

A small point of confusion here is that there are two Mutukulas, one on the Ugandan side of the border and one on the Tanzanian side. I think the various contexts require that all the mentions of Mutukula on this page be to the Ugandan one. The cover of Rwehururu’s book has a photo of Amin, with a group of soldiers, posing next to a road sign for Mutukula (there spelled “Mtukula”), which I think must be the Tanzanian Mutukula – the Ugandan one feels like less of a photo opportunity.

27 October: a detachment of the Malire Regiment, of unclear size, is wiped out as the Tanzanian forces capture Mutukula. Contact with the commander of the Regiment is severed. The Marine Regiment and Suicide Regiment are deployed to recover the situation [state radio].[413]

29 October: the Malire Regiment enters Tanzania [state radio].[414]

30 October: the Marine Regiment enjoys successes somewhere against Tanzanian forces [state radio].[415]

31 October: violent mutinies break out in both the “Maline Mechanised Reconnaissance Battalion” (presumably the Malire Regiment) and the “Maline Battalion” (I think this must be the Marine Regiment) [Kenyan radio].[416]

31 October: a delirious state radio announcement of 1 November declares that the entire Kagera salient has been captured by “a few representatives of soldiers from a company from Malire, Marines, Suicide, Simba, Tiger, Gonda, Mountains of the Moon (viz. 2nd Parachute), Striking Force Regiment… as well as a small unit of the School of Infantry and the (sic) section of the President’s Escort.” This feat was apparently accomplished in a mere 25 minutes.[417] The Malire Regiment particularly distinguished itself in this fighting.[418]

“A few representatives of soldiers from a company” of various units, is a hard phrase to interpret. Certainly the propaganda sense is clear – it was a tiny amount of men, demonstrating the overwhelming superiority of the Uganda Army. If we need to find a literal sense for the phrase, it may have been intended to allude to some kind of “battle group” made up of whatever elements of these various units were at hand. The lengthy list of units may well be an accurate-ish list of whoever was then in the theatre. The Malires, Marines and Suicides were already there, and in mid-November we have notices of the Tigers and Airbornes returning from the theatre. The Simbas participating in the fighting is very likely, as they were garrisoned in the south of the country. The Gondas had further to travel. The Striking Force is of very obscure nature (see section 4.6 for my thoughts on this unit).

11 November: the Airborne Regiment, having performed some mission or other at the front line, returns to its barracks. The Malire Regiment also returns to its barracks, where it is feted by Amin in person. [state radio].[419]

13 November: the Tiger Battalion also returns triumphantly to its barracks [state radio].[420]

15 November: Amin tours the front line and southern Uganda. He visits Mutukula and Masaka. The Simba Battalion triumphantly returns to its barracks [state radio]. [421]

16 November: the Artillery Regiment returns triumphantly to its barracks [state radio].[422]

21 November: the Gonda Battalion returns triumphantly to its barracks [state radio].[423]

Late November: Rwehururu’s account of the earlier phase of the war is rather vague. He writes that “a few weeks after” Amin’s radio announcement of 1 November (see above), some or all of the Malire Regiment and some of the Suicide Regiment withdrew from the front to their barracks. A core of the Suicide Regiment remained, and was bolstered by fresh recruits to the regiment who had missed the earlier fighting.[424] His account of the October-November phase of the war doesn’t name any other units [Rwehururu].

c. December: Tanzanian forces start bombarding, and sending patrols against, the Suicide Regiment’s positions around Mutukula. The chronology of this episode is slightly obscure. Rwehururu writes that his men were under Tanzanian artillery fire for “more than two months”, counting backwards from 21 January [Rwehururu].[425]

1-2 December or circa: Amin spends three days at Mutukula and environs. The Marine Regiment and other unnamed units mop up in the Kakuto-Lukoma-Mutukula area. [state radio, and Tanzanian radio quoting state radio].[426][427]

4 December: Amin harangues the Malire Regiment at their barracks [state radio].[428]

6 December: more mopping-up in the Lukoma-Mutukula area by unnamed units. Amin returns to the area to oversee operations [state radio].[429]

25 December: Tanzanian forces subject Ugandan positions around Mutukula, defended by the Artillery Regiment and the Malire or Suicide Regiment, to a heavy bombardment. I think this is more likely the Suicide Regiment, as we have a notice for the Malires having returned to their barracks, while we know from Rwehururu that the Suicides remained in the area [C&F].[430]

30 December or circa: skirmishes with Tanzanian forces at an unspecified location involving the Gaddafi Battalion, the Parachute Battalion, the Artillery Regiment and Marine Regiment armour [state radio].[431]

20 January: a company of the Simba Battalion is destroyed by Tanzanian forces “6 miles inside” the Ugandan border [state radio].[432]

21-22 January: Tanzanian forces capture Mutukula, defended by the Malire or Suicide Regiment. A Sherman is knocked out in the fighting and the regiment is mostly destroyed. [C&F].[433]

21-22 January: Tanzanian forces capture Mutukula, defended by the Suicide Regiment. A Ugandan tank (model unspecified) is disabled but the regiment tows it away successfully [Rwehururu].[434]

Note 1: I pause here to try to untangle the last two entries. Rwehururu doesn’t mention the Malire Regiment in his account of the unsuccessful defence of Mutukula. Cooper & Fontanellaz don’t offer a source for their assertion that it was specifically a Sherman knocked out – this is perhaps their own elaboration, based on Rwehururu’s account of the Suicide Regiment (which C&F think was the Malire Regiment) having lost a tank of unspecified type – C&F knew the Malire Regiment had Shermans and filled the gap accordingly.

Note 2: I pause here again to comment on some aspects of the following entries. I think, in short, in order to harmonise A&H’s account with Rwehururu’s one, we need to do two things, neither of which is a massive stretch, hopefully. I keep in mind that Rwehururu was at Masaka, away from the key events as they were going on, and of course that he was writing decades after the war.

A&H describe the next phase of the Tanzanian advance, after their capture of Mutukula, as the capture of Lukoma and Simba Hills. They then move onto Kalisizo, about 30km north up the road from Sanje. A&H don’t mention the capture of Sanje itself. Theirs is a detailed account, and I must assume that they ignore Sanje simply because nothing happened there which was worth describing – i.e., it was lightly defended or undefended, and the Tanzanians had no difficulty capturing it. 

Rwehururu, meanwhile, mentions Lukoma (abandoned after Mutukula), and mentions fighting at Sanje, but doesn’t mention Simba Hills.

I think the reconciliation is that Sanje and Simba Hills were the same place, militarily speaking. They’re about 5-7km from each other,[435] with Simba Hills to the south. A&H describe Simba Hills, and the adjoining elevations, as being a commanding position vis-à-vis the airfield at Lukoma, which was around 11km south-east, and we might imagine it had the same status vis-à-vis the closer Sanje, on its other side. When Simba Hills were captured by Tanzanian forces, either the Ugandans abandoned Sanje, as now indefensible, or they simply retreated beyond it, allowing the Tanzanians to capture it. 

Rwehururu’s chronology of these events is rather vague – the only anchor is that the Tanzanian advance on Sanje began around the same time as Amin was celebrating the anniversary of his coup on 25 January. I think a natural reading of his account requires Sanje to have fallen by about the first week of February, which is earlier —but not much earlier— than A&H’s account. So I think we might need to nudge Rwehururu’s account into February by an extra week or so, which I don’t think is too much of a stretch.

After 21 January, before c. 25 January: the Suicide Regiment withdraws from Mutukula and also Lukoma, where it apparently had elements, and re-groups at Sanje. The 1st Infantry Brigade moves to Sanje to relieve it. The Suicide Regiment then withdraws to its barracks at Masaka [Rwehururu].[436]

After 21 January: the Gaddafi Battalion is sent from its barracks to Sanje, near the Tanzanian border [C&F].[437]

c. 25 January: Tanzanian forces advance on Sanje. “Less than a week later” elements of the Gaddafi Battalion, or perhaps of the entire 1st Infantry Brigade, begin retreating to Masaka [Rwehururu].[438]

10 February: the 1st Infantry Brigade engages Tanzanian forces “10 miles inside” Uganda. Elsewhere (location unspecified) the Air and Seaborne Battalion, Gonda Battalion, Simba Battalion and Chui Battalion engage Tanzanian forces. The Marine Regiment and Malire Regiment are in the theatre but not engaged [state radio].[439]

11-13 February: Tanzanian forces defeat the Suicide Regiment and Gaddafi Battalion and capture Simba Hills. They capture six T-55s and three OT-64s [C&F].[440]

13 February: Tanzanian forces capture Simba Hills. An unspecified Ugandan unit abandons “six medium tanks” [A&H].[441]

A pause re: the two entries above. I don’t rate C&F’s entry highly. They have both the Suicides and the Gaddafis fighting at Simba Hills, which might be a misreading of Rwehururu, overlooking that he has the Suicides having withdrawn to Masaka by this point. C&F seem to have arrived at “six T-55s and three OT-64s” by combining the “six medium tanks” of A&H with a mid-February news wire item[442] which quotes a Tanzanian source as saying that they captured “a… T-55 tank and four [sic!] armoured personnel carriers in two days of heavy fighting”. However, this item (still quoting from the Tanzanian source) seems to say that this fighting took place somewhere around Mutukula and Kukunyu, suggesting that this is actually a delayed notice of the fighting around Mutukula in late January, not of the Simba Hills fighting in mid-February.[443] 

However, we still have A&H’s description of Uganda losing six tanks. What unit could these have come from? The Suicides are the obvious candidate, but one would presume they took their armour with them when they withdrew to Masaka. On the other hand, they might’ve been ordered to leave their tank component at Sanje while the infantry component withdrew, although the military sense behind that is not immediately obvious. I haven’t seen any mentions of the relieving Gaddafi Battalion having their own tanks, so perhaps someone thought it was unwise to leave the front line tank-less. In any event, from this point, Rwehururu never mentions his unit having tanks again, whatever that might suggest.

I see nothing to suggest that the Malire Regiment or the Marine Regiment were in the theatre at this point, except the state radio announcement of 10 February, which I treat cautiously. I note, also, that (for whatever reason) that announcement specified that those two units were not in action.

15 February: Tanzanian forces capture a Ugandan tank during fighting in the ?Kakunyu area [Tanzanian radio].[444]

Before 20 February: the Parachute Battalion successfully ambushes Tanzanian forces somewhere in the vicinity of Gayaza (sic) [C&F].[445]

20 February: Tanzanian forces defeat the Gaddafi Battalion at Kalisizo [C&F].[446]

After 20 February: The Suicide Regiment, 1st Infantry Brigade and Chui Battalion dig in at Masaka and environs [Rwehururu].[447]

23 or 24 February: the 1st Infantry Brigade and Chui Battalion prematurely withdraw from Masaka, obliging the Suicide Regiment to withdraw also [Rwehururu].[448]

24 February: Masaka, defended by the Suicide Regiment, is captured by Tanzanian forces [A&H].[449]

After 24 February: the Suicide Regiment withdraws in the direction of Sembabule, reaches Sembabule (at some point or other) and digs in [Rwehururu].[450]

25 February: Mbarara, defended by the Simba Regiment, is captured by Tanzanian forces [C&F].[451]

After 25 February: the Simba Regiment, supported by a “detachment of” the Parachute Battalion, digs in north of Mbarara [C&F].[452]

27 February: The Suicide Regiment recaptures Masaka [state radio].[453] If this isn’t a total fabrication, it must refer to some ephemeral re-occupation which was quickly reversed by Tanzanian forces. Rwehururu, who I think would have mentioned it had it happened, doesn’t.

c. late February: the Marine Regiment, Border Guard Unit, Air and Seaborne Battalion, Parachute Battalion, Chui Regiment, “other units from the 1st Brigade”, the Artillery Regiment and the Army Transport Corps all assemble for the defence of Lukaya [Rwehururu].[454]

Undated [sometime after 24 February but before 10 March(?)]: the Suicide Regiment or the Malire Regiment (I think it must be the Malire Regiment) and Artillery Regiment dig in at Nabusanke [C&F].[455]

2 March: the Air and Seaborne Battalion beats off an attempt by anti-Amin Ugandan forces to capture Tororo. Units coming from Mubende (presumably the Tiger Battalion) and the Kampala direction (there are many candidates) assisted [A&H].[456]

2 March: the Air and Seaborne Battalion mutinies at Tororo [Kenyan radio].[457]

3 March: the Eastern Command recaptures Tororo [state radio].[458]

By 4 March: the Simba Battalion has abandoned Mbarara, “leaving their armoury intact” [UK press].[459]

7 March: unexplained shooting heard within the Gaddafi Barracks [South African radio].[460]

10-12 March: Tanzanian forces win a significant victory at Lukaya. Libyan forces do most of the work on the Ugandan side. The Artillery Regiment and a unit with Shermans (i.e., the Malire Regiment) participate [C&F].[461]

c. Early-mid-March: heavy fighting between the Tiger Battalion and Tanzanian forces at Sembabule. This starts “at the same time as” the Battle of Lukaya. [A&H].[462] C&F put the end date as 5 April.[463]

Undated [c. early-mid-March from other sources]: heavy fighting between the Suicide Regiment and Tanzanian forces at Sembabule [Rwehururu].[464]

16 March: the Suicide Regiment, defending Lukaya, is defeated by Tanzanian forces [Kenyan radio].[465] I think this must be a clear error.

By 19 March: the Simba Regiment and Parachute Battalion dig in north of Mbarara [A&H].[466]

19 March: Amin visits the Simba Battalion and the Tiger Battalion, in “the Mbarara area” [state radio].[467]

28 March: the Malire Regiment is dug in “around the palace of the former King of Baganda” – the old Camp Malire at Lubiri, perhaps. Some sort of in-fighting or mutiny or desultory coup attempt perhaps occurs [New York Times].[468]

Undated [c. early April]: the Parachute Battalion beats off a Tanzanian advance towards Fort Portal [C&F].[469]

3 April: Amin visits Tororo and harangues the Air and Seaborne Battalion [state radio].[470]

9 April: The Malire Regiment and the “Bombo Battalion from the President's native region in the northwest West Nile Province” (the Kifaru Battalion?) defend Kampala [New York Times].[471]

12 April: the Suicide Regiment, still at Sembabule, begins a lengthy withdrawal to Masindi, and then to the West Nile [Rwehururu].[472]

Undated [c. 22 April, from other sources]: Tanzanian forces capture Jinja, overcoming the remnants of the Gaddafi Battalion [A&H].[473]

Undated [c. 22 April, from other sources]: Tanzanian forces capture Jinja. They find “12 abandoned MBTs and APCs” in the Gaddafi Barracks [C&F].[474]

Undated [c. late April or early May]: Tanzanian forces capture Moroto and receive the surrender of the remnants of the Gonda Battalion [A&H].[475]

Undated [c. late April or early May]: the Simba Battalion makes a fighting retreat in the direction of Fort Portal [A&H].[476]

Undated [c. late April or early May?]: Tanzanian forces capture Masindi, defended by the Artillery Regiment [A&H].[477]

Undated [c. April, from other sources]: Tanzanian forces capture Bombo (garrison of the Malire Regiment), where they find three working T-54s [A&H].[478]

27 May: The Kifaru Battalion is defeated at Bondo [a Swahili book I haven’t read, via Wikipedia].[479]

***

8.4 Some thoughts on the above entries

8.4.1 As I mentioned in the introduction to the section above, I don’t, for the present moment, want to get into the weeds assessing the accuracy of the various notices I have seen concerning the Kagera War. Once I start doing that, I’m more or less beginning to write a history of the war, which is an enormous exercise I’m wholly unqualified for.

There are a few questions, however, which I think are worth trying to straighten out a bit now.

***

8.4.2 Units which are rarely attested

The Marine Regiment, despite being one of the crack units, and having been much engaged in 1978, seems to have kept a curiously low profile in 1979. The earliest 1979 notice I’ve seen is a 10 February state radio announcement, which puts them (along with the Malire Regiment) in a strategic reserve type position in the border area, not actively participating in the fighting then on-going. Rwehururu lists the Marines among the units assembled for the defence of Lukaya. I have no further notices.

The Kifaru Battalion isn’t heard from until April 1979, when it was fighting Tanzanian forces between Kampala and Entebbe. It then seems to have retreated back to its home base at Bondo. Being (presumably) an extremely West Nile unit, this one might’ve been kept back by Amin as a special reserve. Alternatively, it might’ve feared being cut off in Kampala, a considerable distance from its home area, and retreated.

The Commando Battalion isn’t attested once in the entire war. If it was distributed around various places as static detachments (see its section above), its constituent parts perhaps just stayed obscurely at their posts until they were overran.

***

8.4.3 A lengthy and tedious digression on the activities of the Suicide Regiment and the Tiger Regiment after the fall of Masaka

What were the Suicide Regiment and the Tiger Regiment doing after the fall of Masaka? As the Wikipedia editors note,[480] we have two seemingly irreconcilable accounts of this.[481] This question also leads onto a couple of other related areas which I will attempt to also deal with.

To recap the above section. On 24 February 1979, Tanzanian forces captured Masaka, the Suicides’ garrison. State radio reported that the Suicides recaptured it on 27 February but, if this wasn’t simply a morale-boosting lie, the Tanzanians must’ve forced them back out of it soon afterwards. Rwehururu doesn’t mention it in his book.

There are two main roads which leave Masaka on its north side. One goes in a north-easternly direction, through Lukaya and over the Katonga River, eventually arriving at Kampala. The other goes north-westerly, through Villa Maria, over the Nabajuzi and Kyoga Rivers, to Sembabule. After Sembabule it forks, with a northern branch leading to Mubende and then (via further forks) to Masindi.

Rwehururu writes that, after leaving Masaka, the Suicides took up position at Villa Maria – that is, they placed themselves on the north-westerly road.[482] He doesn’t explain why they did this, instead of taking the north-easterly road. They subsequently withdrew to Sembabule, where they took up position again.[483] Here, they fought off heavy Tanzanian attacks. They missed the Battle of Lukaya,[484] and were still at Sembabule holding off the Tanzanians when Kampala fell on 11 April.[485] Hearing this, they abandoned Sembabule and made for Masindi, where various remnants of the army were regrouping. They arrived on 13 April.[486] They were the only meaningful force there – the only other units present were scraps of the Artillery Regiment and the support services.[487] After a short time, and despite some successes, the Suicides, and whoever else was there, were obliged to evacuate Masindi for Kigumba.[488] The Suicides proceeded to Arua, where the regiment seems to have dissolved itself.[489]

Conspicuous by their absence in Rwehururu’s narrative is the Tiger Battalion. He doesn’t mention them even once, which is very curious, in view of the following:

• Avirgan & Honey devote a page, from the Tanzanian perspective, to the hard fighting around Sembabule. They credit this entirely to the Tiger Battalion, and don’t mention the Suicide Regiment. The last notice of the Suicides in their book, in fact, is the fall of Masaka.

• The route taken by the Suicides –from Masaka to Masindi– must I believe have taken them through Mubende, garrison of the Tigers.

• The Tigers being at Sembabule seems inherently plausible – after the loss of southern Uganda, I imagine they would’ve been more likely to retreat in the direction of their own home base at Mubende, rather than cut themselves off from it by retreating towards Kampala.

My best guess is that the Tigers fought alongside the Suicides all the way from Masaka to Arua, and Rwehururu left them out of his book, to concentrate the glory on his own regiment, and to revenge himself upon the Tigers’ commanding officer, Lt-Col. Abiriga, who had disparaged the Suicides at Masindi.

Rwehururu’s account of the Masindi episode is worth exploring in detail.[490] The Suicides arrived at Masindi. There, they were the “only real fighting force”. They met Abiriga there – what he was doing at Masindi is not stated. For no reason, Abiriga abused the Suicides roundly, and insisted they either leave Masindi, or consent to be split up into small units. Not satisfied with this, he publicly doubted the bravery of the Suicides, and claimed that “all those who had joined the army as cadets [such as Rwehururu] were actually cowards, and he could only equate them to women”. Rwehururu is careful to remind the reader that Abiriga was a mere NCO at the time of the coup, and, indeed, that he (Rwehururu) had been responsible for giving him officer training.[491] He calls Abiriga a “foulmouthed major”, even though he was a lieutenant-colonel, and at this point in command of a brigade. Rwehururu’s men clamour for his permission to kill Abiriga, but he magnanimously refuses. Abriga drops out of Rwehururu’s narrative at this point, but we know from a notice in Avirgan & Honey that, like the Suicides, he made it to Arua, presumably alongside whatever of his men he could convince to go with him.[492]

A complication is that Avirgan & Honey’s account of the Sembabule campaign doesn’t mention the Suicides, only the Tigers. My instinct, however, would be not to read too much into this. Rwehururu’s account of the fighting at Sembabule is lengthy and detailed, and I can’t believe simply imagined it. Avirgan & Honey’s attention to the names of Ugandan units is somewhat intermittent, and they write from the Tanzanian perspective. As they describe it, the reason why the Tanzanians were at Sembabule is because the Tanzanian general staff consulted a map and noted that, if one Tanzanian column was advancing on Fort Portal, and the other on Kampala, there would be a large space between the two columns, encompassing the Tigers’ barracks at Mubende, empty of Tanzanians. This would leave the Tigers free to advance southwards from Mubende and take the Tanzanians in the rear. The Tanzanians thus advanced on Mubende, and quickly found their fears confirmed when they encountered the Tigers at Sembabule.[493] Neutralising the Tigers was the reason for the whole exercise – and so, Avirgan & Honey mention the Tigers.

***

8.4.4 Did the Suicide Regiment fight at Lukaya?

Wikipedia provides, with reservations, a single source which claims the Suicides were at the Battle of Lukaya. For all the reasons stated above, I think that the Suicides cannot have been at Lukaya. The source is a contemporary newspaper article, which doesn’t cite its own sources, so I think it can be safely disregarded.[494] I myself have found a Kenyan source to the same effect (given in the appropriate place above), which I also disregard, with suitable reservations over discarding two notices of the same item.

Cooper & Fontanellaz write that, after the fall of Masaka, “Tanzanian intelligence indicated that whatever was left of the Suicide Regiment and the Artillery & Signals Regiment was already entrenching near Nabusanke”.[495] Nabusanke is on the north side of the Katonga and so, if the Suicides were there, that presumably must put them in the Lukaya campaign. I think this has to be credited to C&F thinking the Suicide Regiment and the Malire Regiment were the same unit, and the intended reference should thus be to the Malire Regiment.

***

8.4.5 Did the Tiger Battalion fight at Tororo?

Avirgan & Honey describe an attempt on 2 March 1979 by anti-Amin Ugandan forces, based in Kenya, to capture Tororo. The Air and Seaborne Battalion, barracked there, successfully repulsed the attack, with help from reinforcements which arrived, write A&H, “from Mubende in the north, and from the Kampala road, where they had been hiding and waiting in reserve”.[496] A&H don’t name the units to which these reinforcements belonged, but it seems that the Tigers are the most likely unit to have come from Mubende.

A problem here is that nowhere offers a particularly exact chronology of when the Sembabule fighting began. The only statement I can find is in A&H, which puts it, not too exactly, “at the same time” as the Battle of Lukaya (10-11 March).[497]

I don’t have any notices of the Tigers being at the front line in February, so I think this could be reconstructed as them being at their barracks until the start of March, perhaps in anticipation of making the kind of flanking move on the Tanzanian Kampala column the Tanzanians feared they would. However, the crisis at Tororo (which, if it had fallen, would have opened up a second front entirely) was pressing enough that the Tigers were dispatched to Tororo to deal with it. If we assume that they remained at Tororo for mopping up, etc., until 3-5 March, or so, that still gives them about a week to get back to Mubende and then down to Sembabule in time for an engagement around the same time as the Battle of Lukaya.

This is all hard to reconcile with the state radio claiming that Amin visited the Simbas and the Tigers “in the Mbarara area” on 19 March, but I’m inclined to dismiss this as propaganda.

 FOOTNOTES

[1] Tom Cooper & Adrian Fontanellaz, Wars and Insurgencies of Uganda 1971-1994 (2015), 23.

[2] David Martin, General Amin (1978 revised edition), 280-281.

[3] George Ivan Smith, Ghosts of Kampala (1980), 131.

[4] For example, the BBC’s Summary of World Broadcasts of 28.04.1974 (for 27.04.1974) quotes Amin referring to “two mechanised brigades composed of six battalions”. Whether or not these six battalions existed in any meaningful sense is another matter, but the structure described is entirely plausible and seems to fit the other evidence.

[5] Summary of World Broadcasts 07.02.1974 (for 06.02.1974).

[6] Henry Kyemba, A State of Blood (1977), 137.

[7] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 18.

[8] State radio claimed on 30 October 1978 that the Marine Regiment had “fought side by side with Egyptian soldiers in the 1973 October war.” United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 30.10.1978, B11.

[9] See https://wwiiafterwwii.wordpress.com/2015/05/24/idi-amins-shermans/ for an excellent technical description of these.

[10] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 6, 8.

[11] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 18.

[12] Keesing's World News Archives, Volume 21, August, 1975 Uganda, Page 27290.

[13] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2f4LCE2Vx3Y

[14] Summary of World Broadcasts 01.10.1974 (for 30.09.1974)

[15] AP Archive, “Seven Years of Amin”. Tank 726 can also be seen in (I think, early) Kagera War footage.

[16] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 24.

[17] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 24.

[18] Summary of World Broadcasts 08.03.1974 (for 06.03.1974). Elsewhere, Summary of World Broadcasts 13.07.1974 mentions Amin visiting this unit’s tanks – the type not specified, but the confirmation it had tanks (or, at least, something the state radio thought it could plausibly describe as “tanks”) is notable.

[19] Summary of World Broadcasts 15.07.1974 (for 13.07.1974).

[20] Keesing's World News Archives, Volume 21, August, 1975 Uganda, Page 27290.

[21] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 30.

[22] Summary of World Broadcasts 28.04.1974 (for 27.04.1974)

[23] Only a few weeks earlier, on 10 March, he had claimed it had four mechanised battalions. Malire, Suicide, Kifaru and… Chui, perhaps, if it existed that early in the year. (Summary of World Broadcasts 13.03.1974 ((for 10.03.1974)).

[24] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 22.

[25] Summary of World Broadcasts 07.05.1975 (for 05.05.1975)

[26] https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/carl/nafziger/939BXAC.pdf

[27] See Tony Avirgan & Martha Honey, War in Uganda (1982), 7. They claim that “about half were southern Sudanese and Nubians” – they seem to have used “Nubian” to mean people of non-Ugandan origin, as they distinguish Nubians from “indigenous Ugandans, mainly Kakwas and other West Nile peoples”, who made up another quarter. Who is still left in the Nubian category, after Sudanese, Kakwas and West Nilers have been excluded, is not immediately obvious to me. The final quarter were Zairians.

[28] Summary of World Broadcasts 04.08.1971 (for 03.08.1971).

[29] Summary of World Broadcasts 01.01.1973 (for 30.12.1972).

[30] Summary of World Broadcasts 22.06.1973 (for 20.06.1973).

[31] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.01.1974 (for 31.12.1973).

[32] Summary of World Broadcasts 03.01.1974 (for 01.01.1974).

[33] Summary of World Broadcasts 04.04.1974 (for 04.04.1974).

[34] Summary of World Broadcasts 03.09.1974 (for 01.09.1974).

[35] Wikipedia.

[36] Summary of World Broadcasts 27.01.1975 (for 25.01.1975).

[37] Summary of World Broadcasts 10.05.1978 (for 08.05.1978).

[38] Summary of World Broadcasts 21.06.1978 (for 19.06.1978).

[39] Summary of World Broadcasts 13.12.1978 (for 11.12.1978).

[40] Summary of World Broadcasts 09.03.1979 (for 07.03.1979).

[41] Summary of World Broadcasts 06.03.1974 (for 04.03.1974).

[42] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.10.1974 (for 30.09.1974).

[43] Summary of World Broadcasts 04.03.1974.

[44] Voice of Uganda, 14 July 1975.

[45] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.10.1974 (for 30.09.1974).

[46] Summary of World Broadcasts 18.12.1974 (for 12.12.1974).

[47] Kyemba, 45.

[48] Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890-1985 (1987), 28.

[49] Violations of Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Uganda, a Study by the International Commission of Jurists (1974), 55.

[50] Summary of World Broadcasts 06.04.1972 (for 04.04.1972).

[51] Summary of World Broadcasts 04.11.1974 (for 01.11.1974).

[52] Summary of World Broadcasts 19.04.1975 (17.04.1975).

[53] Summary of World Broadcasts 19.04.1975 (17.04.1975).

[54] Smith, 131.

[55] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.03.1972 (for 01.03.1972).

[56] Omara-Otunnu, xvii.

[57] Summary of World Broadcasts 15.03.1977 (for 13.03.1977).

[58] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 22.11.1978.

[59] Summary of World Broadcasts 13.02.1971 (for 12.02.1971)

[60] Thomas James Lowman, Beyond Idi Amin: Causes and Drivers of Political Violence in Uganda, 1971-1979 (2020), 40.

[61] Omara-Otunnu, xvii.

[62] ICJ Report 1974, 55.

[63] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearance of People in Uganda (1974), 420.

[64] Summary of World Broadcasts 01.03.1973 (for 27.02.1973).

[65] Summary of World Broadcasts 06.11.1976 (for 04.11.1976).

[66] Summary of World Broadcasts 10.09.1977 (for 09.09.1977).

[67] 1st Gonda Regiment. United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 22.11.1978.

[68] Omara-Otunnu, xviii.

[69] Defence and Foreign Affairs Handbook of 1978, 527.

[70] Summary of World Broadcasts 25.03.1975 (for 23.03.1975).

[71] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 14.11.1978.

[72] https://carleton.ca/uganda-collection/the-bennett-collection-uganda-argus-newspaper/ (1972 archive), 171.

[73] Summary of World Broadcasts 22.07.1976 (for 21.07.1976).

[74] Lowman, 169.

[75] ICJ Report 1974, 55.

[76] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.03.1973 (for 28.02.1973).

[77] US diplomatic cable KAMPAL 03032 121707 Z.

[78] Summary of World Broadcasts 05.02.1974 (for 02.02.1974).

[79] Summary of World Broadcasts 17.08.1976 (for 15.08.1976).

[80] Summary of World Broadcasts 17.08.1976 (for 15.08.1976).

[81] 1st Tiger Regiment. United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 14.11.1978, B9.

[82] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 19.03.1979, B5. We read in Avirgan & Honey (195) that Abiriga was nicknamed “Nine-Nine”.

[83] US diplomatic cable 1973KAMPAL01195.

[84] Summary of World Broadcasts 01.11.1972 (for 30.10.1972)

[85] Omara-Otunnu, xviii.

[86] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (1995), vol. 9, 8638. Rwehururu (at 24) agrees.

[87] Summary of World Broadcasts 01.11.1972 (for 30.10.1972)

[88] US diplomatic cable 1973KAMPAL01195.

[89] https://www.independent.co.ug/state-updf-barracks/

[90] Kyemba, 45.

[91] https://carleton.ca/uganda-collection/the-bennett-collection-uganda-argus-newspaper/ (1972 archive), 171.

[92] Summary of World Broadcasts 05.04.1974 (for 03.04.1974).

[93] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.12.1974 (for 29.11.1974).

[94] Summary of World Broadcasts 12.05.1973 (for 10.05.1973).

[95] Rwehururu, 43.

[96] Summary of World Broadcasts 24.05.1974 (for 22.05.1974).

[97] Ogenga Otunnu, Crisis of Legitimacy and Political Violence in Uganda, 1979 to 2016 (2017), 312.

[98] At 56.

[99] Summary of World Broadcasts 08.06.1974 (for 06.06.1974).

[100] Otunnu, 312.

[101] Voice of Uganda, 15 August 1975.

[102] Smith, 131.

[103] Summary of World Broadcasts 07.10.1977 (for 05.10.1977).

[104] Voice of Uganda, 29 September 1978.

[105] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 16.11.1978.

[106] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 19.03.1979.

[107] Summary of World Broadcasts 22.11.1972 (for 21.11.1972).

[108] Summary of World Broadcasts 21.12.1973 (for 19.11.1973).

[109] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.12.1974 (for 29.11.1974).

[110] British Pathé archive, “GOVERNMENT FILM, FOUND IN KAMPALA, SHOWS FORMER PRESIDENT IDI AMIN FETED BY HIS TROOPS…”

[111] Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1310-1321, 117.

[112] Summary of World Broadcasts 05.02.1974 (for 03.02.1974).

[113] Kyemba, 91.

[114] Dennis Hills, The White Pumpkin (1976), 308.

[115] Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1310-1321, 117.

[116] Summary of World Broadcasts 08.03.1974 (for 06.03.1974). Elsewhere, Summary of World Broadcasts 13.07.1974 mentions Amin visiting this unit’s tanks – the type not specified, but the confirmation it had tanks (or, at least, something the state radio thought it could plausibly describe as “tanks”) is notable.

[117] Summary of World Broadcasts 12.09.1975 (for 10.09.1975).

[118] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (1995) vol. 7, 6111.

[119] Bernard Rwehururu, Cross to the Gun (2002), 99.

[120] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 50.

[121] https://www.independent.co.ug/state-updf-barracks/

[122] Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1310-1321, 117.

[123] Summary of World Broadcasts 07.11.1974 (for 06.11.1974).

[124] Summary of World Broadcasts 05.02.1974 (for 03.02.1974).

[125] Summary of World Broadcasts 09.12.1974 (for 06.12.1974).

[126] Smith, 131.

[127] Summary of World Broadcasts 13.10.1977 (for 11.10.1977).

[128] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.05.1978 (for 30.04.1977).

[129] Summary of World Broadcasts 10.05.1978 (for 08.05.1978).

[130] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 28.02.1979.

[131] Summary of World Broadcasts 09.03.1979 (for 03.03.1979).

[132] https://newsday.co.ug/2022/05/23/operationalise-regional-govts-as-we-commemorate-the-1966-lubiri-invasion/

[133] US diplomatic cable 1978BONN08787.

[134] Voice of Uganda, 3 October 1978. Hills, 330.

[135] Omara-Otunnu, 81.

[136] Omara-Otunnu, 72. This passage is somewhat unclear.

[137] Summary of World Broadcasts 07.05.1975 (05.05.1975).

[138] Omara-Otunnu, 151.

[139] ICJ Report, 55.

[140] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (1995), vol. 7, 6058.

[141] ICJ Report, 55.

[142] Kyemba, 45. Not all officers were of this regiment – the commanding officers of several others were murdered during this incident as well. See ICJ 1974, 55.

[143] https://carleton.ca/uganda-collection/the-bennett-collection-uganda-argus-newspaper/ (1972 archive), 171.

[144] Summary of World Broadcasts 22.03.1974 (for 20.03.1974).

[145] Lowman, 123.

[146] Aidan Southall, Social Disorganisation in Uganda: Before, during, and after Amin (1980), 630.

[147] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.04.1974.

[148] Summary of World Broadcasts 28.01.1976 (for 27.01.1976).

[149] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (1995), vol. 7, 6153.

[150] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Mafuta_Mingi

[151] Summary of World Broadcasts 14.10.1978 (for 11.10.1978).

[152] Summary of World Broadcasts 08.11.1968 (for 07.11.1968).

[153] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (1995), vol. 10, 9298.

[154] Omara-Otunnu, 81.

[155] North of Kampala. Not to be confused with Bondo, near the border with Zaire. Cf. 1978BONN08787.

[156] US diplomatic cable 1978BONN08787.

[157] ICJ Report, 55.

[158] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (1995), vol. 7, 6058.

[159] Summary of World Broadcasts 11.07.1972 (for 07.07.1972).

[160] US diplomatic cable KAMPAL 02035 211452 Z. Rwehururu writes that the c/o c. September 1972 was Juma Butabika, which I think must be a mistake (37).

[161] Summary of World Broadcasts 11.07.1972 (for 07.07.1972).

[162] US diplomatic cable KAMPAL 02035 211452 Z.

[163] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.01.1974 (for 31.12.1973).

[164] Summary of World Broadcasts Feb 74, 5.

[165] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (1995), vol. 7, 6159. Adrisi calls him the commander of the Marines, but he must be misspeaking here.

[166] Summary of World Broadcasts 22.06.1976 (for 21.06.1974).

[167] Smith, 131.

[169] Voice of Uganda, 21 September 1978.

[170] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 14.11.1978.

[171] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (1995), vol. 7, 6058.

[172] Summary of World Broadcasts 25.03.1974 (for 24.03.1974). 24 March is the day after the Arube incident – it’d make sense for Amin to have put a loyalist in interim command of the regiment on that date, but the notice I have is merely that he was acting c/o on that date, not that he was appointed acting c/o on that date.

[173] Martin, 274.

[174] Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1802-1811, 60.

[175] Summary of World Broadcasts 05.01.1972 (for 03.01.1972).

[176] Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1802-1811, 60.

[177] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (1995) vol. 7, 6064.

[178] ICJ Report, 55.

[179] Voice of Uganda, 19 August 1975.

[180] Summary of World Broadcasts 03.05.1973 (for 30.04.1973).

[181] Summary of World Broadcasts 29.01.1974 (for 27.01.1974).

[182] Summary of World Broadcasts 03.01.1974 (for 01.01.1974).

[183] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (1995) vol. 7, 6063-6064.

[184] Summary of World Broadcasts 03.01.1974 (for 01.01.1974).

[185] Summary of World Broadcasts 04.11.1974 (for 01.11.1974).

[186] Summary of World Broadcasts 11.01.1975 (for 09.11.1975)

[187] Summary of World Broadcasts 11.01.1975 (for 09.11.1975).

[188] Voice of Uganda, 19 August 1975.

[189] Smith, 131.

[190] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (1995) vol. 7, 6253.

[191] Summary of World Broadcasts 18.12.1974.

[192] https://web.archive.org/web/20170301170648/https://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/PeoplePower/Life-as-an-Amin-army-commander/689844-3828170-93o55rz/index.html

[193] Summary of World Broadcasts 18.02.1974 (for 16.02.1974).

[194] Summary of World Broadcasts 18.12.1974.

[195] Lowman, 169.

[196] Avirgan & Honey, 51.

[197] https://web.archive.org/web/20170301170648/https://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/PeoplePower/Life-as-an-Amin-army-commander/689844-3828170-93o55rz/index.html

[198] https://web.archive.org/web/20170301170648/https://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/PeoplePower/Life-as-an-Amin-army-commander/689844-3828170-93o55rz/index.html

[199] Smith, 131.

[200] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 07.12.178, B5.

[201] Southall, 630.

[202] It isn’t attested in contemporary reports of the 1972 fighting.

[203] Defence and Foreign Affairs Handbook of 1978, 527.

[204] Summary of World Broadcasts 03.01.1974 (for 01.01.1974).

[205] Summary of World Broadcasts 07.05.1975 (for 05.05.1975).

[206] Sir Peter Jermyn Allen, Days of Judgment (1987), 236.

[207] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 02.02.1979.

[208] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (1995) vol. 7, 6160.

[209] Allen, 236.

[210] Allen, 292. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (1995) vol. 7, 6153.

[211] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (1995) vol. 7, 6160.

[212] Allen, 264.

[213] Summary of World Broadcasts 03.01.1974 (for 01.01.1974).

[214] Summary of World Broadcasts 27.08.1975 (for 25.08.1975).

[215] Summary of World Broadcasts 11.01.1975 (for 09.11.1975).

[216] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (1995) vol. 7, 6160.

[217] Summary of World Broadcasts 10.05.1978 (for 08.05.1978).

[218] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.10.1978 (for 29.09.1978).

[219] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 07.12.1978, B8.

[220] Voice of Uganda, 5 July 1975.

[221] Summary of World Broadcasts 25.03.1974 (for 24.03.1974).

[222] Summary of World Broadcasts 12.12.1968 (for 10.12.1968).

[223] Omara-Otunnu, 81.

[224] https://carleton.ca/uganda-collection/the-bennett-collection-uganda-argus-newspaper/ (1972 archive), 171.

[225] Omara-Otunnu, 81.

[226] https://inyenyerinews.info/democracy-freedoms/what-caused-gen-oyite-ojoks-helicopter-crash/

[227] CIDPU 1974, 42.

[228] CIDPU 1974, 283.

[229] CIDPU 1974, 43.

[230] Summary of World Broadcasts 12.05.1973 (for 10.05.1973).

[231] Summary of World Broadcasts 17.08.1976 (for 15.08.1976).

[232] Summary of World Broadcasts 17.08.1976 (for 15.08.1976).

[233] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 06.07.1978, B6.

[234] Summary of World Broadcasts 05.01.1973 (for 03.01.1973).

[235] Summary of World Broadcasts 12.05.1973 (for 10.05.1973).

[236] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 06.07.1978, B6.

[237] https://carleton.ca/uganda-collection/the-bennett-collection-uganda-argus-newspaper/ (1972 archive), 171.

[238] Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, January 6-12, 1975, 26899.

[239] Los Angeles Times, 7 November 1974, A8.

[240] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 02.10.1978, B3.

[241] Summary of World Broadcasts 08.04.1974 (for 06.04.1974).

[242] Summary of World Broadcasts 19.09.1972 (for 18.09.1972).

[243] Summary of World Broadcasts 23.09.1971 (for 22.09.2021).

[244] Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1310-1321, 117.

[245] Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1310-1321, 117.

[246] Summary of World Broadcasts 03.01.1974 (for 01.01.1974).

[247] Summary of World Broadcasts 11.01.1975 (for 09.11.1975).

[248] Summary of World Broadcasts 11.01.1975 (for 09.11.1975). This is the only holder of the Victorious Cross I’m aware of, other than Amin himself. How he won this lofty honour I sadly do not know.

[249] Smith, 131.

[250] Summary of World Broadcasts 07.03.1973 (for 06.03.1973).

[251] Summary of World Broadcasts 29.11.1972 (for 27.11.1972).

[252] Summary of World Broadcasts 14.11.1974 (for 12.11.1974).

[253] Summary of World Broadcasts 11.01.1975 (for 09.01.1975).

[254] Summary of World Broadcasts 14.07.1975 (11.07.1975).

[255] Summary of World Broadcasts 14.07.1975 (11.07.1975).

[256] Summary of World Broadcasts 15.12.1976 (for 13.12.1976).

[257] Summary of World Broadcasts 13.12.1978 (for 11.12.1978).

[258] https://carleton.ca/uganda-collection/the-bennett-collection-uganda-argus-newspaper/ (1972 archive), 171.

[259] https://carleton.ca/uganda-collection/the-bennett-collection-uganda-argus-newspaper/ (1972 archive), 171.

[260] Voice of Uganda, 15 August 1975.

[261] ICJ Report, 55.

[262] Summary of World Broadcasts 07.06.1972 (for 05.06.1972).

[263] Summary of World Broadcasts 26.07.1973 (for 23.07.1973).

[264] Summary of World Broadcasts 18.05.1974 (for 16.05.1974).

[265] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 27.11.1978.

[266] Summary of World Broadcasts 26.07.1973 (for 23.07.1973).

[267] Summary of World Broadcasts 14.08.1973 (for 10.08.1973).

[268] Omara-Otunnu, 60.

[269] Omara-Otunnu, xviii.

[270] Omara-Otunnu, 71.

[271] Omara-Otunnu, 72.

[272] https://www.nytimes.com/1974/11/11/archives/uganda-rebellion-reported-crushed.html

[273] Otunnu, 312.

[274] Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, January 6-12, 1975, 26899.

[275] US diplomatic cable KAMPAL 01759 231535 Z.

[276] Summary of World Broadcasts 08.11.1968 (for 07.11.1968).

[277] Summary of World Broadcasts 18.05.1973 (for 17.05.1973).

[278] https://www.nytimes.com/1974/11/11/archives/uganda-rebellion-reported-crushed.html

[279] Otunnu, 312.

[280] Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, January 6-12, 1975, 26899.

[281] US diplomatic cable KAMPAL 02035 211452 Z.

[282] Kessing’s Record of World Events, Volume 23, June 1977 Zaire, 28399.

[283] Kessing’s Record of World Events, Volume 23, June 1977 Zaire, 28399.

[284] Summary of World Broadcasts 29.04.1977 (for 27.04.1977).

[285] Voice of Uganda, 28 March 1978 (via Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa no. 1913, 1).

[286] Summary of World Broadcasts 30.06.1978 (for 28.06.1978).

[287] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 10.07.1978, B4.

[288] Summary of World Broadcasts 21.04.1977 (for 19.04.1977).

[289] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 02.11.1978, B9.

[290] Summary of World Broadcasts 28.11.1978 (for 27.11.1978).

[291] Omara-Otunnu, 79.

[292] CIDPU 1974, 23.

[293] e.g. CIDPU 1974, 71.

[294] Voice of Uganda, 21 September 1978.

[295] Summary of World Broadcasts 4412–4487, 381.

[296] CIDPU 1974, 23.

[297] Summary of World Broadcasts 22.12.1972 (for 20.12.1972)

[298] Summary of World Broadcasts 03.01.1974 (for 01.01.1974).

[299] Martin, 278-279.

[300] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (1995) vol. 7, 6264.

[301] Martin, 279.

[302] Omara-Otunnu, 81.

[303] Rwehururu, 124.

[304] Omara-Otunnu, 81.

[305] ICJ Report, 55.

[306] Summary of World Broadcasts 31.10.1972 (for 28.10.1972).

[307] Rwehururu, 124.

[308] Voice of Uganda, 15 August 1975.

[309] Summary of World Broadcasts 08.04.1974 (for 06.04.1974).

[310] Rwehururu, 18.

[311] Summary of World Broadcasts 05.07.1973 (for 03.07.1973).

[312] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (1995) vol. 4, 3813.

[313] Summary of World Broadcasts 31.08.1972 (for 29.08.72). Actual name as heard “Charges Arrure”.

[314] Summary of World Broadcasts 09.01.1972 (for 07.01.1972).

[315] Summary of World Broadcasts 05.07.1973 (for 03.07.1973).

[316] Summary of World Broadcasts 03.01.1974 (for 01.01.1974).

[317] Summary of World Broadcasts 28.08.1976 (for 26.08.1976).

[318] US diplomatic cable KAMPAL 01759 231535 Z.

[319] Summary of World Broadcasts 07.03.1973 (for 06.03.1973).

[320] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.01.1974 (for 31.12.1973).

[321] Summary of World Broadcasts 23.09.1971 (for 22.09.1971).

[322] Summary of World Broadcasts 22.12.1972 (for 20.12.1972).

[323] US diplomatic cable KAMPAL 02035 211452 Z.

[324] US diplomatic cable KAMPAL 02035 211452 Z.

[325] Summary of World Broadcasts 14.11.1974 (for 12.11.1974).

[326] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.01.1974 (for 31.12.1973).

[327] Rwehururu, 124.

[328] Summary of World Broadcasts 22.12.1972 (for 20.12.1972).

[329] Summary of World Broadcasts 22.12.1972 (for 20.12.1972).

[330] Summary of World Broadcasts 22.06.1973 (for 20.06.1973).

[331] Summary of World Broadcasts 07.05.1975 (for 05.05.1975).

[332] Omara-Otunnu, 72.

[333] Voice of Uganda, 14 August 1975.

[334] ICJ Report, 55.

[335] ICJ Report, 55.

[336] Summary of World Broadcasts 31.08.1972 (for 29.08.1972).

[337] Summary of World Broadcasts 12.05.1973 (for 10.05.1973).

[338] Summary of World Broadcasts 07.11.1973 (for 06.11.1973).

[339] Summary of World Broadcasts 08.03.1974 (for 06.03.1974).

[340] Summary of World Broadcasts 18.12.1974 (for 12.04.1974).

[341] Omara-Otunnu, 72.

[342] Omara-Otunnu, 72.

[343] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.04.1973 (31.03.1973).

[344] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.12.1974 (for 29.11.1974).

[345] Omara-Otunnu, 81.

[346] Omara-Otunnu, 81.

[347] Summary of World Broadcasts 11.07.1972 (for 08.07.1972).

[348] CIDPU 1974, 43.

[349] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 22.11.1978, B4.

[350] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (1995) vol. 4, 3813.

[351] ICJ Report, 55.

[352] CIDPU 1974, 43.

[353] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.03.1972 (for 01.03.1972).

[354] Summary of World Broadcasts 11.07.1972 (for 08.07.1972).

[355] Summary of World Broadcasts 01.03.1973 (for 27.02.1973).

[356] Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa 1310-1321, 117.

[357] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.01.1974 (for 31.12.1973).

[358] Summary of World Broadcasts 03.01.1974 (for 01.01.1974).

[359] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (1995) vol. 7, 6060.

[360] Summary of World Broadcasts 19.04.1975 (17.04.1975).

[361] Voice of Uganda, 11 September 1978.

[362] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 22.11.1978, B4.

[363] Rwehururu, 108.

[364] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.03.1972 (for 01.03.1972).

[365] Smith, 131.

[366] https://web.archive.org/web/20181223031703/https://www.monitor.co.ug/artsculture/Reviews/I-was-condemned-for-being-Amins-soldier/691232-3201718-k9mcsm/index.html

[367] Summary of World Broadcasts 11.01.1975 (for 09.11.1975)

[368] Smith, 131.

[369] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (1995) vol. 7, 6251-6252.

[370] Avirgan & Honey, 87.

[371] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 05.03.1979, B6.

[372] Omara-Otunnu, 81.

[373] Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa 1310-1321, 117.

[374] Omara-Otunnu, 81.

[375] Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa 1310-1321, 117. Summary of World Broadcasts 12.05.1973 (for 10.05.1973).

[376] For the 3rd, KAMPAL 01121 271836 Z. The 4th can be inferred from later developments.

[377] Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa 1310-1321, 117.

[378] Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa 1310-1321, 117.

[379] Summary of World Broadcasts 25.08.1973 (for 23.08.1973).

[380] Summary of World Broadcasts 03.09.1973 (for 31.08.1973).

[381] Summary of World Broadcasts 01.11.1972 (for 30.10.1972). He isn’t explicitly described as “acting” but, as a major, he surely must’ve been.

[382] Summary of World Broadcasts 29.03.1973 (for 27.03.1973).

[383] Summary of World Broadcasts 18.12.1972 (for 15.12.1972).

[384] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.04.1973 (for 31.03.1973).

[385] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 27.11.1978.

[386] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.04.1973 (for 31.03.1973).

[387] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.12.1974 (for 29.11.1974).

[388] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.12.1974 (for 29.11.1974).

[389] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 18.09.1978, B5.

[390] Smith, 131

[391] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gayaza_Hills

[392] Summary of World Broadcasts 11.01.1975 (for 09.11.1975).

[393] Smith, 131.

[394] Voice of Uganda, 11 September 1978.

[395] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 16.11.1978.

[396] Rwehururu, 51. Presumably, having become commander of a brigade, he was entitled to a promotion, to colonel or brigadier, but Avirgan & Honey describe him (at 195) in c. late May as still a lieutenant-colonel.

[397] Summary of World Broadcasts 10.05.1978 (for 08.05.1978).

[398] Summary of World Broadcasts 23.09.1971 (for 22.09.1971).

[399] Summary of World Broadcasts 23.03.1972 (for 21.03.1972).

[400] Summary of World Broadcasts 28.04.1974 (for 27.04.1974). The odd phrasing about the national origins of the weapons is Amin responding to a recent insinuation the USSR was his sole supplier.

[400A] Summary of World Broadcasts 02.05.1978 (for 30.04.1977).

[401] Andrew Mambo & Julian Schofield, Military Diversion in the 1978 Uganda-Tanzania War (2007), 312. Rwehururu’s account (at 95) is along these lines – he gives the invasion force as “a handful of some of the Malire troops” and “the troops that had been permanently stationed at the border”.

[402] Mambo & Schofield, 312.

[403] Allen, 236.

[404] Wikipedia, citing a book  I haven’t read.

[405] Summary of World Broadcasts 14.10.1978 (for 11.10.1978)

[406] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 13.10.1978, B2.

[407] Summary of World Broadcasts 03.11.1978 (for 01.11.1978).

[408] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 16.10.1978, B7-8.

[409] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 19.10.1978, B4.

[410] Summary of World Broadcasts 24.10.1978 (for 22.10.1978).

[411] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 24.

[412] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 27.10.1978, B6.

[413] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 27.10.1978, B5-6.

[414] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 30.10.1978, B10.

[415] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 30.10.1978, B11.

[416] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 31.10.1978, B11.

[417] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 02.11.1978, B9.

[418] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 14.11.1978, B11.

[419] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 14.11.1978, B9, B11.

[420] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 14.11.1978, B9.

[421] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 16.11.1978, B10-11 and 17.11.1978, B4.

[422] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 17.11.1978, B5.

[423] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 22.11.1978, B4.

[424] Rwehururu. 97-98.

[425] Rwehururu. 98-103.

[426] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 04.12.1978, B4.

[427] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 04.12.1978, B6.

[428] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 05.12.1978, B2.

[429] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 07.12.1978, B6.

[430] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 28.

[431] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 02.01.1979, B6.

[432] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 19.01.1979, B7.

[433] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 29.

[434] Rwehururu, 104-106.

[435] The exact location of Simba Hills is a little elusive, but I take it to be around -0.8493131661549415, 31.51838295759639

[436] Rwehururu, 108-109.

[437] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 29.

[438] Rwehururu, 109, 111-112.

[439] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 12.02.1979, B3-5.

[440] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 29-30.

[441] Avirgan & Honey, 81-82.

[442] I have seen it in the 17 February edition of the Register Guard of Eugene, Oregon.

[443] Issue of 17 February 1979, 5A.

[444] Summary of World Broadcasts 17.02.1979 (for 15.02.1979).

[445] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 30. Wikipedia sites this battle at “Gayaza Hills”, which it places south of Mbarara.

[446] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 30.

[447] Rwehururu, 113.

[448] Rwehururu, 113.

[449] Avirgan & Honey, 84-85.

[450] Rwehururu, 120.

[451] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 31.

[452] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 31.

[453] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 28.02.1979, B3.

[454] Rwehururu, 124.

[455] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 32.

[456] Avirgan & Honey, 87-88.

[457] Summary of World Broadcasts 05.03.1979 (for 03.03.1979).

[458] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 05.03.1979, B6.

[459] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 08.03.1979, B7.

[460] Summary of World Broadcasts 09.03.1979 (for 07.03.1979).

[461] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 33.

[462] Avirgan & Honey, 92.

[463] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 35.

[464] Rwehururu, 121-124.

[465] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 19.03.1979, B5.

[466] Avirgan & Honey, 88

[467] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 19.03.1979, B5.

[468] https://www.nytimes.com/1979/03/29/archives/tanzanian-and-ugandan-invaders-close-in-on-kampala-from-two-sides.html

[469] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 35.

[470] United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service 04.04.1979, B7.

[471] https://www.nytimes.com/1979/04/10/archives/amins-forces-appear-to-fight-harder-amins-prospects-called-dim.html

[472] Rwehururu, 128-132.

[473] Avirgan & Honey, 159.

[474] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 37.

[475] Avirgan & Honey, 170.

[476] Avirgan & Honey, 174.

[477] Avirgan & Honey, 177.

[478] Avirgan & Honey, 180.

[479] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Bondo

[480] And I’m obliged to them for adverting me to this in the first place.

[481] E.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Sembabule#Notes.

[482] Rwehururu, 114-115.

[483] Rwehururu, 120.

[484] Rwehururu, 125-126.

[485] Rwehururu, 127.

[486] Rwehururu, 128-129.

[487] Rwehururu, 129.

[488] Rwehururu, 130. His reference to “men and officers from other units” implies it wasn’t just the Suicides.

[489] Rwehururu, 134-135.

[490] This all Rwehururu, 129-130.

[491] This might not actually be correct. Earlier in his book, (51) Rwehururu seems to say that Abiriga was a lieutenant at the time of the coup.

[492] Avirgan & Honey, 195.

[493] Avirgan & Honey, 92.

[494] https://web.archive.org/web/20190123010515/https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1336873/katonga-bridge-jewel-liberation

[495] Cooper & Fontanellaz, 32.

[496] Avirgan & Honey, 87.

[497] Avirgan & Honey, 92.

5 March 2023
Completely re-written and considerably enlarged, 14 October 2025